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ABSTRACT
Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes the right
of every person to seek asylum from persecution in other countries.
Accordingly, the United Nations adopted the Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees in 1951. The Convention, in its first article, sets the
definition of the term refugee. It also establishes a criteria that decision
makers should follow in order to determine if someone is a refugee. Since
the implementation of the Convention, writers and practitioners have
regularly been using an approach that maintains a dichotomy between
economic migrants and political refugees. This dichotomy is regularly used
by decision makers to reject entire classes of applicants on the basis that their
claims reflect economic migrant status rather than refugee status. The current
situation of global destitution has pushed many people from poor countries
to flee to more developed countries where they apply for asylum in order to
find protection. These applicants have started to make claims that have begun
to challenge the boundaries of the Refugee Convention and question the
validity of the traditional dichotomy between economic migrants and
political refugees. This paper identifies the conceptual and analytical
challenges presented by claims based on economic and social deprivation. It
assesses how to overcome these challenges by using a creative interpretation
of the Refugee Convention based on recent developments in international
human rights law. The central argument of this paper is that in spite of, the
traditional dichotomy made between economic migrants and political
refugees by legal scholars, the Refugee Convention is capable of
accommodating many more claims based on social or economic deprivation.
To prove this argument, the paper analyzes each element of the refugee
definition and shows how socio-economic-based claims can fulfill the
requirements of a refugee claim.
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I - Introduction
In the last few decades, the world has witnessed many global crises including wars,
armed conflicts, revolutions against dictatorial regimes and natural disasters. These
crises have put millions of people in devastating living conditions of poverty and
destitution that pushed them to flee their countries and seek asylum in other places in
the hope of finding peace and protection. These people have been mainly moving from
poorer countries in the East and South towards more developed and wealthier countries
in the West and North creating what is currently called “the refugee crisis.” 1 The
phenomenon of refuge from destitution and economic deprivation poses many difficult
legal and policy challenges for refugee-receiving countries. The main questions raised
in this context are: How should these countries respond to claims based on economic
and social deprivation? What are the main international legal principles that could
constrain the receiving states’ authority in rejecting these claims?
The 1951 Refugee Convention is regarded as the key instrument in public international
law for protecting refugees. This Convention articulates the main conditions that must
be fulfilled in order to recognize someone as a refugee. It also poses many legal
obligations on state parties regarding the proper treatment asylum-seekers should
receive during the process of determining their refugee status from the moment they
reach these states’ lands until they leave it. Since the Refugee Convention was
implemented, there has been a traditional position in the field which maintains a
dichotomy between “economic migrants” and “political refugees” the former falling
outside the application of the convention. Claims based on economic and social
deprivation have routinely been rejected by many domestic refugee courts in different
legal systems. They have also been rejected for a long time by the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Nevertheless, recent developments reflected in
1

This term has been continuously used by many countries and UN agencies to describe the current
situation of mass displacement of people that caused huge waves of migrants and refugees moving from
a country to another seeking protection and relief. See, The United Nations, Global Issues: Refugees,
2019, available at: https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/refugees/, See also, Care, Global
Refugee Crisis, 2019, available at: https://www.care.org/emergencies/global-refugee-crisis. I believe that
the term “crisis” does not properly mirror the current situation taking place in the Mediterranean Sea,
however, this term has been frequently used by European elites for their own political benefit to
intimidate and convince their populations that they are under imminent threat from the movements of
migrants and refugees heading to Europe. The actual crises are taking place in Syria where millions have
fled their country as a result of war and poverty. Moreover, in Yemen, 24 million have been displaced in
the last few years because of the Yemeni war. Furthermore, the catastrophic situation of refugees and
migrants inside Africa as millions of refugees and migrants have been fleeing Burundi, Central African
Republic, and South Sudan escaping armed conflicts and destitution.

the literature reveal many scholarly voices arguing against the traditional view that
adopts this simplistic dichotomy. Moreover, recent case law shows the willingness of
many courts to consider economic-based claims as falling under the context of the
Refugee Convention. The question remains at this point is whether economic and social
deprivation can constitute a valid claim for refugee status or claims must be based on
civil and political rights violations?
This question is particularly pressing for three main reasons. First, the last two decades
have seen significant advances regarding issues related to the interpretation of the
Refugee Convention, especially, when it comes to the recognition of new claims that
had rarely been recognized previously. Decision makers have increasingly started to
accept the integral connection between international refugee law and other fields of law
such as international human rights law. Such development has expanded the definition
of the term “refugee” and allowed accommodation of new types of claims previously
thought to fall outside the Refugee Convention such as claims based on domestic
violence and female genital mutilation as forms of persecution. 2 These advances also
include economic and social deprivation if proper interpretation and connection can be
established between both fields of law. Second, these developments in the field of
international refugee law join with other developments in the field of international
human rights which recognize economic and social rights as being of equal value and
importance compared to civil and political rights. Such advances should be examined
and thoroughly discussed. Third, many commentators have argued that in order for
socio-economic claims to be recognized, the definition of refugee must be amended,
re-formulated or a new protocol added to the Refugee Convention recognizing such
claims. 3 Nevertheless, it is rare to find literature uses the definition in its existing form
and argues that it is capable of responding to these claims by addressing the conceptual
and theoretical challenges regarding the concept.4

2

See, Deborah Anker, Boundaries in the Field of Human Rights, at 138.
See, for example, Arthur C. Helton and Eliana Jones, ‘What is Forced Migration?’ (1999) 13
Georgetown
Immigration Law Journal 521, 526 at 526.
4
Michelle Foster was one of the first scholars to adopt this idea. In her book, International Refugee
Law and Socio-Economic Rights: Refuge from Deprivation, Foster gives a very persuasive analysis to
the Refugee Convention and its ability accommodate new claims based on economic and social
deprivation.
3
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This paper explores the legal challenges created by the phenomenon of refuge from
destitution and economic deprivation. It engages with the question of whether the 1951
Refugee Convention in its existing form is capable of recognizing claims based on
economic and social deprivation. In order to do so, the paper challenges the traditional
dichotomy between economic migrants and political refugees which has been widely
accepted by legal scholars and practitioners to date. It argues that the Convention can
accommodate claims based on economic deprivation with proper interpretation based
on recent developments in international human rights law. It also identifies the
conceptual and analytical challenges that may arise from these claims and assesses to
what extent these challenges can be resolved or overcome via different creative
interpretations of the Refugee Convention. Moreover, this paper examines each element
of the refugee definition and the extent to which economic claims can fulfill those
elements; it follows the same approach used in any refugee status determination
assessment, which starts by assessing the element of well-founded fear then the element
of persecution and finally establishes “the causal link” between them and the remaining
conventional grounds.
This paper does not engage with the analysis of whether the definition of the term
“refugee” which is already established in the Refugee Convention should be amended
or reformulated in order to accommodate new claims based on economic and social
deprivation. It argues, otherwise, that the definition in its current form is capable of
absorbing these claims. To establish my claim, this paper examines recent
developments in the fields of international refugee law and international human right
law. There are other fields of law that could be relevant to my argument such as
international treaty law and international migration law, nevertheless, they will not be
extensively examined in this paper.
The topic of this paper can be discussed from many angels and perspectives such as the
pure political analysis which questions how decision makers should engage politically
with people seeking asylum with claims based only on economic deprivation.
Development can be another perspective one can use to discuss this topic as many
literature have engaged with theories about how refugees and migrants should be
integrated as an important development mechanism receiving states can take advantage
from. This question has been raised lately in 2018 to elaborate on the decision of
German chancellor Angela Merkel to accept the resettlement of 10.000 refugees to
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Germany. Nevertheless, this paper’s scope engages with the question of refugees and
economic deprivation from a merely legal perspective; it provides a creative
interpretation to the Refugee Convention and asks for the implementation of this
interpretation by decision makers in refugee hosting states. The paper can be seen as an
important reference judges and other legal practitioners which they can use while
determining refugee status for refugees with economic and social claims.
This paper in divided into six chapters. Chapter II explores the history of the refugee
crisis. It indicates the movements of refugees and migrants from the West and South to
the North and East and the reasons behind these movements. It focuses on the current
situation of migration through the Mediterranean Sea and how refugee-receiving states
have dealt with that situation in a way that brought up the use of the term “the boat
people” to describe the devastating conditions these migrants and refugees face during
their flight to Europe. Following, the chapter elaborates on the situation of poverty in
the world. It establishes a logical relationship between the rates of poverty in some
countries and the numbers of people displaced in these countries in order to show how
destitution and economic deprivation are the main motives behind the huge movements
of refugees and migrants we are witnessing today.
Chapter III provides the legal framework governing the definition of refugee. It starts
with explaining the traditional dichotomy between economic migrants and political
refugees. Following, it explores various legal definitions under international law such
as migrant, refugee, voluntary migration and involuntary migration. The chapter also
describes the process of refugee status determination (RSD) which is conducted by
domestic refugee courts and the UNHCR to determine whether a person should be
considered as a refugee. Finally, it explores the inclusion criteria for refugee status
consisting of the elements of the refugee definition such as alienage, well-founded fear,
persecution and the five conventional grounds.
Chapter IV elaborates the reasonableness of taking international human rights law as
an appropriate framework for interpreting the Refugee Convention. It first explores
recent literature calling for a more objective and universal standard for interpreting the
Refugee Convention. It then argues that international human rights law is the most
appropriate standard to be adopted for interpretation. The last section of this chapter
explores the situation of economic and social rights in the field of international human
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rights law. It elaborates on traditional views which categorize rights and put civil and
political rights at a higher level than social and economic rights. Two of these
approaches are examined at the end of this chapter: Carlier’s hierarchal approach and
Hathaway core obligation approach.
Chapter V challenges the legitimacy of putting rights into hierarchies by exploring
recent developments in the human rights field that has proved that all rights should be
treated equally and considered on the same level. It then analyzes the main elements of
the refugee definition and to what extent economic and social deprivation can be a valid
claim for refugee status. It argues that socio-economic right violations could amount to
persecution by presenting recent developments in the field and reflected in the literature
that support this argument. Moreover, it establishes the causal link between economic
persecution and the five conventional grounds and how recent developments in the field
of international human rights law have allowed many courts to invent new grounds
based on economic and social deprivation.

5

II – Background
A. Brief History of Global Politics and its relation to the Movements of Refugees
and Migrants
In the last century, refugees and migrants have taken much of the global attention.
International disasters have led to devastating outcomes; two world wars resulted in the
killing of millions of civilians, and internal armed conflicts have led millions to flee
their homes with their relatives to find a safe place to live. In addition, Natural disasters
have forcibly displaced huge numbers of people to different areas of their home
countries and led others to leave for other countries. Altogether, dictators ruling poor
countries has caused major violations of people’s fundamental rights, which have left
them no option but to seek the protection of other countries.
For the past two centuries, the West has directed its attention to the east and the south:
They recognize that in order to maintain their wealth they need to take natural resources
from other countries that do not have the military or political capacity to defend
themselves. They take such resources in return for providing protection to those
countries. When these resources have moved north and west, the countries of the east
and the south fell into extreme poverty and destitution. 5 Furthermore, dictators who
used to ease the process of shifting resources to the West have oppressively ruled the
people of their countries and committed major massacres against those who tried to
oppose them. They made sure to maintain security in their countries by oppressing
people and force them to stay silent.
This all has led to massive movements of populations around the globe. These
movements or flows - as some writers call them – have alerted wealthier countries that
these flows will be heading toward them, which is actually what has happened.
In 2017, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) issued a
shocking report determining the numbers of people displaced worldwide. 6 This report
states that there are more than 68.5 million forcibly displaced persons around the globe;
25.4 million are refugees who fall under the mandate of UNHCR and UNRWA, 3.1
See Beckett J. “Creating Poverty” Hoffmann and Orford (ed.s) The Oxford Handbook of International
Legal Theory (2016), p 5. In this article Beckett illustrates how far the North and West have always
depended on East and South resource flows to make their development. He also argues that Public
International Law was structured in a way that ‘incentivizes’ this process and the creation of poverty.
See also, Beckett J. The Deceptive Dyad.
6
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2017, 19
June 2017, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/5b2d1a867.html .
5
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million are still seeking asylum and not yet granted refugee status, while 40 million are
internally displaced in their home countries. 7 The report points out that the majority of
refugees come mainly from five countries: Syria, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Myanmar
and Somalia and that is due to the crisis these countries are going through in recent
years. 8
Additionally, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) issued its global
report in 2018 indicating that latest statistics estimate the number of migrants around
the world to be over 244 million, which is 3.3% of the world’s population.9 The same
organization indicated in its report in 2000 that the total number of migrants was around
155 million people, which means that in the last 18 years the number of migrants has
increased by 89 million. 10 There are various reasons for the migration stated in these
and other reports: There are two main categories: push and pull factors. Push factors
for migration include violence and war, poverty, unemployment, natural disasters and
family separation. Pull factors are things as seeking safety and freedom, jobs, food
availability, family reunification and a better quality of life. 11 From those categories,
we can find two main kinds of migration, voluntary migration through which the person
seeks a higher quality of life and involuntary migration in which the person is forced to
leave the country of habitual residence.
B- The Boat People and the Situation of Refugees in the Mediterranean Sea
The current situation taking place in the Mediterranean Sea has grabbed the attention
of the whole world. Hundred thousands of refugees and migrants have been trying to
cross the sea to Europe through boats, risking their and their families’ live. This has
created a new crises for refugees and migrates who are seeking international
protection. The stories of these migrants and refugees are symbols of the injustice
world we are living in today.
The term “boat people” originally referred to the thousands of Vietnamese who fled
their country by sea following the collapse of the South Vietnamese government in

7

Id.
Id.
9
International Organization for Migration (IOM), World Migration Report 2018, 2018, available at:
http://www.iom.int/wmr/world-migration-report-2018.
10
Id.
11
Justice For Immigrants, Root Causes of Migration, February 2014, Available at:
https://justiceforimmigrants.org/what-we-are-working-on/immigration/root-causes-of-migration/.
8
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1975. The escaped in small vessels with no protection or arms leaving them prey to
pirates. During this time, many suffered from dehydration, starvation, and death by
drowning. Since then, the term has been applied to the waves of refugees who have
attempted to reach the United States by boat from Cuba and Haiti and also to Afghan
and other refugees seeking asylum in Australia. After more than 40 years, the crisis
remains ongoing but this time in the Mediterranean Sea.
According to UNHCR, in only the last five years, nearly two million refugees and
migrants have arrived in European lands by boats through the Mediterranean Sea. Most
of them have arrived in Italy, Cyprus and Malta. 12 These figures show that in 2015 a
refugee crisis was occurring, as in one year more than a million refugee and migrant
had reached Europe.13 That happened before the European Union in 2016 started to take
actions imposing restrictions on the arrivals and making deals with countries such as
Turkey, Morocco, Libya and Egypt to regulate migration flows and raise security
restrictions on the irregular migration. 14 According to UNHCR statistics, in those five
years and around 18000 people had died or were still missing while attempting to cross
the Mediterranean Sea during the process of their migration. 15
The current situation of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants in Italy is devastating
and is getting worse day-by-day. The International Organization of Migration (IOM)
announced that according to available statistics, more than 2000 migrants died from
drowning in the Mediterranean Sea while they were heading to Italy in 2017. It was
predicted that this number would rise in 2018 and it did. 16 The main reason behind this
crisis is the new procedures the Italian government has started to take against migrants.
In November 2018, the Italian government ordered the seizure of the migrant rescue
ship Aquarius. The ship had joined in many successful operations of rescuing migrants
and refugees from drowning into the sea. The government claimed that the clothes worn
by migrants on their voyage from Libya to Italy could have been contaminated by HIV,
12

The Guardian, What is the current state of the migration crisis in Europe?, November 2018, available
at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/15/what-current-scale-migration-crisis-europe-futureoutlook.
13
Id.
14
Reliefweb, European Leaders Pursue Migration Deals with North African Countries, Sparking
Concerns about Human Costs, December 2017, available at:
https://reliefweb.int/report/world/european-leaders-pursue-migration-deals-north-african-countriessparking-concerns-about.
15
UNHCR, Operational Portal of Refugee Situation, Mediterranean Situation, available at:
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean.
16
Supra note 7.
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meningitis and tuberculosis and that it took such procedures to protects its citizens from
these dangers.17 The ship was operated by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and SOS
Méditerranée, both charity organizations who had played a pivotal role in the rescue of
refugees and migrants in the past decade. The seizure of the ship was not the only
sanction that has been imposed. Furthermore, 24 people from the team working on the
ship were prosecuted by the Italian Prosecution, MSF was fined nearly a half million
euros for their operations and their bank accounts and frozen in Italy upon such
charges.18
In 2015, Sergio Mattarella was elected president of the Italian Republic with the support
from right and mid-right wing parties. Since then, Matarella has openly declared new
policies to be applied against refugees and migrants reaching the Italian shores through
the Mediterranean Sea. Such policies have extended to procedures taken by the Italian
navy and border guards to push back numerous migrants rescue vessels back to sea and
stand as an obstacle against them reaching their destination. In February 2017, the
Italian government signed an agreement with the Libyan government, endorsed by the
other European Leaders, to train, equip and finance the Libyan coastguard in return for
their support in combatting irregular migration –essentially– to stop vessels before
reaching the Italian shores.
This agreement has been taken seriously by Libya to the extent that after several
months, thousands of migrants and asylum seekers have been detained in detention
camps designated only for irregular migrants under inhumane conditions. UNHCR and
IOM have been struggling to reach such detainees and evacuate them after several
agreements with the Libyan government. 19 UNHCR specifically, has released different
statements condemning the actions carried against the asylum seekers heading to Libya
and putting the responsibility on both Italian and Libyan governments. 20

17

The Guardian, Italy orders seizure of migrant rescue ship over 'HIV-contaminated' clothes,
November 2018, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/20/italy-orders-seizureaquarius-migrant-rescue-ship-hiv-clothes.
18
Id.
19
The Guardian, Deaths at sea expose flaws of Italy-Libya migration pact, July 2018, available at:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/23/mother-and-child-drown-after-being-abandoned-offlibya-says-ngo.
20
UNHCR, UNHCR evacuates vulnerable refugees out of Libya as fighting resumes, October 2018,
available at: https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2018/10/5bc8494b4/unhcr-evacuates-vulnerablerefugees-libya-fighting-resumes.html.
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Such a pact has led several victims and survivors to file numerous cases against the
Italian government before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) alleging that
this agreement had stopped them from reaching Italy and seeking asylum there and
forcing them to return to Libya against their will where they have been subjected to
inhumane conditions, beatings, rape and starvation.21
Such policies reached their peak in 2018 when Matteo Salvini took office as Italy’s
interior minister. Salvini was the first official to shamelessly declare that Italy would
no longer commit to its obligations towards refugees and migrants. In one of his
speeches he boldly stated: Open doors in Italy for good people and a one-way ticket for
those who come to Italy to create commotion and think they will be taken care of. ‘Send
them home’ will be one of our top priorities. 22
The problematic issue in Salvini’s statements in my point of view is not that his
declaring to push away migrants and refugees and going against the non-refoulement
principle, the refugee convention and other human rights instruments, rather, main
problem is that during his speeches he insisted on drawing a distinction between
migrants and refugees, claiming that almost all the people held back in Libya and other
North African countries are actually economic migrants whom if let into Italy they
would take the place of other vulnerable “political refugees” who deserve protection.
Such falsehoods spread by the Italian media have led to the Italian public negative
opinion towards the idea of offering refuge and state protection. This has pushed several
human rights organizations such as Girasoli to issue statements sympathizing with the
public while condemning the Italian public policy; for instance Calogero Santoro the
head of Girasoli stated: “Fake news about migrants have spread all over Italy during
the last campaign. My concern is the future of asylum seekers, people who are eligible
for refugee status. What will happen to them under [Salvini’s] League?” 23

Queen Mary University of London News, Italy’s deal with Libya regarding migrant ‘pull-backs’
faces legal challenge, May 2018, available at: https://www.qmul.ac.uk/media/news/2018/hss/italysdeal-with-libya-regarding-migrant-pull-backs-faces-legal-challenge.html.
22
Al Jazeera, What's next for Italy's immigrants under the populist government?, June 2018, available
at: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/italy-immigrants-populist-government180603130547425.html.
23
The Irish Times, Italy vows to send home undocumented immigrants, June 2018, available at:
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/italy-vows-to-send-home-undocumented-immigrants1.3517841.
21

10

Moreover, other North African countries have joined the agreements with the EU to
crackdown on flows of refugees heading to Europe; Spain and Algeria, for instance,
have made an agreement whereby Algeria would make a concerted efforts to establish
camps for refugees and migrants trying to use its domestic waters to reach Spain and
other European countries.24 In exchange, Spain would give economic support to raise
the efficiency of the Algerian coast guards and to build those camps intended to receive
large numbers of refugees and migrants. 25 Many human rights organizations have
indicated the mass violations Algeria has committed towards refugees and migrants in
the past few years. Beside arresting and detaining people who try to cross to Europe
and send them to camps in remote areas where they face inhumane and degrading
treatment by police authorities, Algerian police round up sub-Saharan migrants in
streets and deport them back to their countries and other countries such as Niger and
Mali. 26 Since 2015, Algeria has repatriated more than 27000 sub-Saharan refugees and
migrants to their home countries and to other countries of asylum. Most of those
refugees have received ill-treatment, and faced violence, and many have been killed
during this process.27
The crisis of refugees in the Mediterranean Sea has become much broader and more
devastating than can be imagined. The Italian stance I previously explained is just one
of many contributing factors in such a crisis. The UNHCR has recently published its
latest report observing the crisis from different perspectives. 28 It has stressed in several
parts of its report that these flows of refugees would never stop until countries meet
their obligations towards international human rights law. 29 It identifies poverty as one
of the root causes of the crisis. It indicates that nearly all asylum-seekers heading to
Europe are from four African countries: Eritrea, Congo, Sudan and Nigeria since those
countries all have gone through severe economic crises that have left thousands of

Reliefweb, Spain and Algeria agree on joint migration crackdown, while at Algeria’s southern border
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internally displaced persons that moved internally and others who have left to
neighboring countries in order to escape poverty and find humane living conditions.
Looking at the statistics one can easily notice that the number of refugees and migrants
heading to Europe are increasing year-by-year regardless of the increasing deaths risks
through traveling by sea because of the new restrictions and procedures taken by
European states. It is obvious that the deteriorating human conditions such as the lack
of water, food, shelter, healthcare, education, and occupation in several African
countries have pushed masses of citizens to prefer risking their lives than slowly dying
of hunger and destitution.
IOM in its latest report has indicated how poverty and socio-economic rights violations
have always been the main root causes for migration especially mixed migration which
means that the flows of migrants are influenced by multiple drive.30 It explains the role
of economic rights violations in pushing people to leave their countries and head for
other countries where can they hope to find better living conditions.31 What is
interesting in this report is that it indicates from various perspectives how motives of
migration and persecution can intersect. It is commonly found that political upheavals,
tribal and ethnic tensions, religious extremism, internal armed conflicts, and serious
violations of civil and political rights are commonly accompanied by serious socioeconomic rights violations as well. This intersectionality highlights how difficult it is
to distinguish between “pure” economic claims from “civil and political” claims.
C- The Situation of Poverty in the World with Focus on Africa
In this part, I would give an overview of the situation of poverty in the world with a
focus on the poverty rates in Africa. I should also present some statistics regarding the
annual death rate for people living in extreme poverty and destitution who die for the
reason that the devastating living conditions resulted from the lack of food, clean water,
health care, education and shelter. My main focus will be on Africa in order to analyze
a prime reason for the immense waves of migration and refuge that is hitting Europe
through the Mediterranean Sea. I believe this part is inseparable to my paper and
essential in order to have a clear image of the situation of population movements around
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the world and give another perspective of how Socio-Economic violations can lead to
shocking outcomes.
According to recent statistics published by the World Bank, more than 10 percent of
the world’s population are living in extreme poverty which is less than 1.90 USD a
day.32 It is important to mention that the 1.9 dollar line has been drawn by The World
Bank depending on the concept of the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) which sets the
currency baseline depending on the baskets of goods and services. The determination
of this poverty line depends mostly on the price of services which are not commonly
available to the poor in countries we would focus on, which renders this standard
arbitrary and does not reflect the actual situation of poverty. 33
In 2015, the number of people living in destitution had reached 736 million people
including 47 million living in East Asia, 7 million in Europe and Central Asia and 413
million living in Sub-Saharan Africa which is Africa. It is clear from the statistics that
more than half of the people living in extreme poverty are from Africa. 34 Focusing on
a few African countries, we can see that the statistics are remarkably shocking; for
instance, in Nigeria, with a total population of 196 million, the amount of people living
in extreme poverty exceeds 92 million which is nearly the half of the population. In the
Democratic Republic of Congo, the total number population is around 83 million, with
nearly 60 million living in extreme poverty which is 71.5% of the population. In Sudan,
there are about 10 million Sudanese citizens living in destitution. Eritrea is not any
better than its fellow African countries, as nearly 40% percent of its population are
living in extreme poverty that is nearly 2.2 million citizens. 35 Other African countries
face similar statistics. Africa has the highest poverty rates even compared to Asia which
has a larger population rates and number of natural disasters and South America which
has similar security and armed conflict conditions.
In the unfair world we are live in today more than 830 million are chronically
undernourished, and 1.1 billion do not have access to safe water and 2.6 billion lack
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access to basic sanitation. 36 Furthermore, around 2 billion people which is nearly one
third of the total world population lack access to essential drugs, 1 billion have no
adequate shelter and 2 billion do not have electricity. Over 790 million adults are
illiterate which increases the percentage of unemployment and increases the crime rate.
The statistics are worse for children. More than 250 million children around the world
between the ages of 5 and 14 do wage work with 8.4 million being in “unconditionally
worst” forms of child labor that involve slavery, forced recruitment in armed conflicts,
forced labor, forced prostitution and pornography.
Moreover, statistics show that poverty kills more than 18 million people annually which
is more than one third of all human deaths. Those deaths are easily avoidable through
better nutrition, clean water and better healthcare.37 That amounts to 300 million deaths
in the last 17 years, which exceeds the number of deaths caused by wars, civil wars,
and government repression. It also shows how important economic and social rights are
if compared to civil and political rights. Recent reports have suggested that more than
2.5 million people die every year in Africa due to lack of health care. Most of them are
preventable through public health intervention. 38 Food is another disaster. Nearly 9
million people die every year of hunger, which means that every hour more than 1000
people die from lack of food.39 What is also striking is that children suffer the most in
this equation with more than 3 million deaths every year. 40 Africa is on the top when it
comes to the number of people dying from starvation as more than 333.2 million people
are living in severe food insecurity. 41
D- Socio-Economic Rights in Refugees Countries of Origin
There is a connection between the economic and social rights conditions of states and
the number of people seeking protection in other states which explains the huge waves
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of refugees and migrants heading to Europe. In the next part I will give a brief summary
of the situation of human rights in Eritrea and Congo with a focus on economic rights,
so you can see how such violations can affect people, pushing them to flee their
countries.
In Eritrea for instance, recent reports show that beside massive civil and political rights
violations, Eritreans have been subjected to significant violations of their economic and
social rights. It has been reported that citizens have been living under very harsh
economic conditions during the last years, with high poverty rates and low standards of
living young Eritreans are forced to work for the state according to military service
rules. All males from the ages of 18 to 50 are eligible for military or “national” service.
This service consists of six months for military training and a year for development
projects conducted by the state.42 After service comes to an end, the state has the right
to re-recruit any person into the military for long periods and oblige him or her to work
on industrial or agricultural projects for the state with very low wages. 43 Furthermore,
the healthcare conditions in Eritrea have been deteriorating for decades; many Eritreans
are infected with diseases and the healthcare system is not sufficiently protect all
citizens.44
Like Eritrea, the Democratic Republic of Congo has witnessed one of the largest
humanitarian crises in Africa in the past few years. With bloody political oppression,
more than 140 active armed groups and very deteriorating living conditions, more than
4.5 million Congolese were displaced from their homes and more than 130.000 people
have fled the country seeking protection and refuge in other countries. 45 Beside the
political and civil aspects of oppression, it is important to mention that Congo is one of
the poorest nations of Africa; regardless being one of the richest countries with natural
sources, more than 70% of the nation are living below poverty line. 46 Congo’s
Education conditions are also deteriorating; 3.5 million children of primary school age
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do not attend schools. 47 In terms of healthcare, the Congolese government has paid little
attention to it; epidemics have grossly spread in the country and many deadly diseases
have been neglected resulting in thousands of deaths every year. 48
As we have seen, the situation of refugees and migrants crossing to Europe through the
Mediterranean Sea is very devastating as European states have used North African
countries to stay as an obstacle before those refugees apprehending them from reaching
European shores. This has resulted to mass violations to the rights of those refugees.
Furthermore, the connection between the numbers of people fleeing to Europe and the
situation of poverty in the world have been established to prove that these people fleeing
their countries are mostly escaping death of poverty and destitution. The next chapter
will look at the legal framework of refugee and migration conventions, and the
definitions of many legal terms such as migrant, refugee, voluntary and involuntary
migration. The process of refugee status determination is also explained showing how
complicated it is to determine if asylum seekers should be recognized as refugees or
not.
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III - The International Legal Framework Governing the Distinction between
Refugees and Migrants
A. The Dichotomy between ‘Migrant’ and ‘Refugee’ under Public Policy
States policies have underpinned the rejection of entire classes of applicants on the basis
that their claims are of an economic nature rather than a political. The first are seen as
economic migrants not refugees, and as a result they are entirely prohibited from
seeking asylum in these states. For instance, the US policy towards Haitians fleeing in
the 1980s saw them are economic migrants and not political refugees. 49 Moreover, the
repatriation of Vietnamese refugees by Hong Kong in the 1980s was based on the same
assumption.50 Moreover, the decision of China to return thousands of North Koreans
with an agreement concluded with their government for being economic migrants.51
Modern history has many more examples for states denying refuge for entire classes of
people depending on the assumption that they are economically motivated.
In the past few years, the same argument has been used repeatedly against refugees, for
example: in 2016 Frans Timmermans, the EU Vice President has claimed that 60
percent of the migrants who come to Europe are coming for economic reasons and then
they are not considered refugees under international refugee law. 52 In Italy, the new
government has decided to deport more than 500.000 people claiming that they are
migrants with ‘economic reasons’ and not refugees, so the Italian government has the
right to deport them back to their home countries. 53 While in the US, President Donald
Trump has threatened to prosecute migrants coming from Mexico, he claims that the
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flows coming to the US consists of economic migrants and once they pass the borders
they become irregular migrants and the government has the right to prosecute them. 54
In the world we are living in today, many western countries have been repeatedly trying
to find an escape from their obligations under international refugee law in order to be
able to stop such flows of people from reaching their lands. The media in western
refugee-receiving countries has been intimately fighting to prove the existence of the
dichotomy between economic migrants and refugees; they do so in order to impose
tougher measures against asylum seekers with economic and social claims.
This debate going around the world on whether the waves of people crossing to Europe
through the Mediterranean Sea are migrants or refugees and whether states are obliged
to protect them or have the right to just return them is a fervent debate. Some policy
makers have insisted that they are migrants so according to international law there is no
legal obligation to harbor them, others contend that they are refugees and they should
be protected and if not it would be a gross violation to international refugee law.
At the same time media platforms have struggled with whether to call them refugees or
migrants, UNHCR published an article asking governments and media to be careful
while using both expressions when referring to the waves heading to Europe. It prefers
to call them “groups of refugees and migrants,” as it is impossible to affirm which group
they may be part of. People who join those waves, may have mixed motives for leaving
their countries. They are escaping persecution, wars, armed conflicts, natural disasters,
and many other reasons.55
As highlighted by the UNHCR, it is impossible to assert whether a group of people are
migrants or refugees, to do so, it requires subjecting these people to an exceedingly
long process to determine their eligibility for refugee status under international refugee
law. In the next section the legal definitions of refugee and migrant terms are presented
to show how blurred the distinction is. Then in the last part, the process of refugee status
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determination under the practice of UNHCR and other regional refugee courts is
discussed.
B. Legal Definitions: Refugees vs. Migrants
In this section I will discuss in detail the legal definition of the terms refugee and
migrant under international law. I will examine different legal instruments and their
definition to these terms in order to prove how complex the situation could be in order
to determine whether the person is a migrant and deserves refugee status or a migrant
that should follow migration procedures. This complexity would help to pave the way
before challenging the traditional dichotomy between the terms.
1. The Definition of the Term ‘Refugee’
There is no unanimous definition for the term ‘refugee’ among states. This term has
been defined by different international and national legal instruments, such as the 1951
Refugee Convention, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention and the
Cartagena Declaration.
Article 1 A (2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention defines the refugee as:
A person who, “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling
to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” 56 This convention is
considered by many scholars and practitioners as the cornerstone of the international
refugee law, it is signed and ratified by 146 states around the world, and have been used
as the main guideline for the UNHCR and many refugee courts in determining refugee
status.
The Organization of African Unity adopted the 1969 Refugee Convention, known as
the OAU Convention, which extends the definition set by the 1951 Refugee Convention
by adding that:
“The term "refugee" shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression,
occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part
or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of
56
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habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin
or nationality.”57
Alike the OAU Convention, the 1984 Cartagena Declaration extends more in the
definition of refugee, it states that refugees also include persons who flee their country
"because their lives, security or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence,
foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violations of human rights or other
circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order."58
It is clear from the above-mentioned different definitions to the term “refugee” from
three different refugee conventions that there is no unanimous definition for such term,
it is the state responsibility to decide whether to extend the umbrella of protection to
include new groups of refugees or to use the narrow approach for defining this term.
2. The Definition of the Term ‘Migrant’
While there is also no clear definition of the term ‘migrant, International Organization
of Migration defines the term migrant as
“Any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or
within a State away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1)
the person’s legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary;
(3) what the causes for the movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay
is.”59
The United Nations, on the other hand, defines the term as “An individual who has
resided in a foreign country for more than one year irrespective of the causes, voluntary
or involuntary, and the means, regular or irregular, used to migrate.”60 The two
definitions seems to be very extensive and blur, as they did not identify the main reasons
behind immigration, or even set a distinction between voluntary and involuntary
migration.
The UNHCR has highlighted in its guidelines how the distinction between the terms
“migrant” and “refugee” is blurred as the examination of many cases has indicated that
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mostly the economic measures states are taking against individuals, can be directed to
them based on racial, religious, political or political discrimination which could amount
to persecution under the definition of the 1951 Refuge Convention. Therefore, it defines
the term ‘migrant’ simply to be,
“[A] person who, for reasons other than those contained in the definition,
voluntarily leaves his country in order to take up residence elsewhere. He may
be moved by the desire for change or adventure, or by family or other reasons
of a personal nature. If he is moved exclusively by economic considerations, he
is an economic migrant and not a refugee.”61
By doing so, the guidelines restricts the application of the definition of migrant to only
voluntary reasons, it disregarded the situation by which a person can involuntarily leave
his country, that is because involuntary migration and refuge are very similar in many
aspects. In addition, it stresses that a migrant is that person whose motives are only
economical, so those with mixed motives cannot be regarded as migrants.
From the previous definitions set by international instruments, it is clear that both terms
intersect in several aspects. The criteria for determining a refugee is immensely
complicated and has a set of condition the applicant must satisfy in order to recognize
as a refugee. Even within international instruments, there are some variations, for
instance, the OAU Convention and the Cartagena Declaration set broader definition
than that mentioned in the 1951 Refugee Convention in order to include more asylumseekers and recognize them as refugees.
On the other hand, international instruments define the term ‘migrant’ in a broader
sense it includes every person who is fleeing his or her country of origin or the country
of habitual residence for various reasons. Some of them are beyond the individuals will,
while others are by his own free will.
The main difference between both terms is that according to International law, states
are obliged to accept asylum-seekers who have refugee claims to cross their borders.
States must also take all necessary measures to protect those refugees and refrain from
returning them back to their home countries. While for migrants, states have the right
to impose their own migration policies, which mostly impose restrictions like visa
procedures and security check. To sum up, in the case of refugees states are obliged to
61
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accept and protect them, while in case of migrants, states have the right to reject them
for different reasons depending on their own policies.
3. Voluntary Migration vs. Involuntary Migration
The International Organization of Migration has formulated a clear definition for the
term “voluntary migration” which depends more on defining the other type on
“involuntary migration or forced migration.” And that any migrant who does not fall
under such a category is deemed to be voluntarily migrating. With a simplified
definition of voluntary migration may posit that it is the action whereby migrants have
the free choice whether to migrate or not. In this type, people mostly choose to migrate
to enhance their living conditions, financial capabilities and social class in the country
they are migrating to. We can also find an equivalent definition to the term “voluntary
migrant” in the general definition IOM proposes for the term ‘migrant,’ as it states
“The term migrant is usually understood to cover all cases where the decision
to migrate was taken freely by the individual concerned for reasons of “personal
convenience” and without intervention of an external compelling factor; it
therefore, applie[s] to persons, and family members, moving to another country
or region to better their material or social conditions and improve the prospect
for themselves or their family.”62
The tricky word in this definition is the word “freely.” How can we know if the choice
was freely taken or the migrant had no other option to choose from? Is the choice a
subjective matter that depends on the feelings of the migrant? Is not the state of fear
different from one person to another? There are countless other questions regarding the
definition of voluntary migration academics have been asking for the decades, however,
until now there has been no consensus on how to define the word “voluntary.” 63
Furthermore, the IOM has tried to define the term ‘Involuntary Migration / Forced
Migration in its glossary. The definition the Organization has proposed is not as clear
as we can expect as it depends on a subjective element which cannot be clearly defined
or educed. It defines it as:
“A migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, including
threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made causes
62
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(e.g. movements of refugees and internally displaced persons as well as people
displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters,
famine, or development projects).”64
Many academics talk about voluntary and involuntary migrants as separate categories.
They start with the theory of “voluntariness” and when a person is voluntarily migrating
to another land or is forced to do so.65 Other distinguished academics have insisted that
it is impossible to recognize both categories as clearly. They prefer to call the waves
heading to Europe as “mixed migration” as people may have mixed motives that drive
them to leave their countries. Some of those motives are purely voluntary, others purely
involuntary and some are mixed between both.66 The theory of ‘voluntariness’ has been
argued among writers; some of them have taken the expansive view while others have
adopted a narrower interpretation depending on their humanitarian view. The expansive
interpretation which has been adopted by writers such as Katy Long, who follows
Nozick’s minimalist approach to rights, considers a person free if their minimal rights
such as the right to life, liberty and property are not threatened but rather protected.67
Other writers such as Olsaretti argue that freedom and voluntariness do not necessarily
intersect as “a choice is voluntary when it is made in the context of acceptable
alternatives or if the lack itself of alternatives is acceptable to the person making the
choice.”68
As we can see, there is no consensus among states, institutions and writers on the
distinction between the terms ‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’ as we can notice the definition
IOM has adopted to the term ‘migration’ includes refugees and asylum-seekers.
Furthermore, the definition of ‘forced migration’ is extremely close to the definition of
the term ‘refuge’ in both people are escaping major events that can threaten their lives,
liberties or properties. UNHCR itself has indicated in its guidelines that it is so tricky
and arduous to indicate whether people fleeing to Europe are considered migrants or
refugees, as to do this the state or the UNHCR should have long individual meetings
with them and listen to their claims in order to determine their refugee status. In the
next and final section of this chapter, I will elaborate about the process of refugee status
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determination (RSD), how it is conducted and conditions that should or should not be
met for an asylum seeker to be considered as a refugee.
C- Refugee Status Determination
According to the 1951 Refugee Convention, states carry the burden of exercising the
refugee status determination process of asylum seekers calling for their protection. A
small number of states fulfills their obligation and fully carry out the RSD process while
others depend on UNHCR to undertake the process and recognize refugees. The RSD
process is not explicitly stated as one of the roles of the UNHCR under its mandate,
however, it is implicitly inferred in under Article 8 of the statute. 69 Since then, the
UNHCR has established its own guidelines for status determination which is followed
by all of its agents and officers worldwide. Those guidelines have also been followed
by domestic courts in formulating their own guidelines.
According to UNHCR guidelines, the RSD process has two main stages; the first stage
is concerned with the facts of the case as claimed by the applicant, while the second
stage applies the definitions set by the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol
to determine the eligibility of the claim for falling under the protection of the
international refugee law. The second stage is divided into two processes, the inclusion
process and the exclusion. The inclusion process depends on the inclusion clauses in
the Refugee Convention and must be satisfied by the applicant to be considered a
refugee. On the other hand, the exclusion process which is conducted after the
inclusion, contains the conditions by which if the applicant satisfies any of them he
should be excluded or the Convention ceases to apply to him. In the next and final part
of this chapter the Inclusion criteria is discussed.
1. The Inclusion Criteria for the Refugee Status
For a person to be recognized as a refugee he must fulfill the criteria set by the 1951
Refugee Convention, in article 1 (a). The definition of the term ‘Refugee’ in the
Convention has four elements; the first element in the Alienage element which requires
the applicant to be outside of his country of origin or habitual residence. Secondly, there
is the element of the “well-founded fear of being persecuted” and this element is
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separated into two elements; the fear itself which has a subjective and objective
perspective and persecution. Most writers consider “persecution” as a separate element
as it is the hardest element to fulfill in the Refugee criteria. To do so, the actors of the
persecution –whether state actors, individuals or both – must be determined.
If the applicant fulfills the first three elements he still has to fulfill the fourth and final
one which is “the five conventional grounds.” The applicant has to show that he is
outside of his country because he has a fear of being persecuted, and this persecution
was directed against him on one or more conventional grounds which are race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion. The four
elements for determining refugee status are considered the main cornerstones of the
1951 Refugee Convention. On the surface, they may seem straight forward, but there
are many different interpretations among scholars, practitioners and courts. In the next
part, the most common interpretations for each element is presented, in order for us to
understand the complexity of defining and distinguishing between refugees, migrants
and others who are not eligible for both statuses.
a) The Alienage
The first element of the Refugee criteria is “Alienage.” For a person to be considered a
refugee, he should be outside of his country of nationality of habitual residence.
According to UNHCR guidelines, this condition is the first to look for when
determining refugee status as it notes that, “for a refugee claim being outside the
country of the claimant nationality is a general requirement and there is no international
protection for a person as refugee within the jurisdiction of his country of nationality
or habitual residence.”70 The next three elements follow this element. The applicant’s
fear of persecution must be connected in one way or another to his country of origin or
the country of his habitual residence when the first is not determinate. 71
b) Well-Founded Fear
Well-founded fear is the second element for refugee status determination. It is one of
the key elements in the definition of Refugee. From the expression itself we can find
that two parts: the fear of the applicant and that the fear should be well-founded. There
have been several scholarly interpretations of this element. Most of them have put the
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process of determining the fear in a bipartite or combined approach. In interpreting the
term we can find that it contains two main factors: the subjective and the objective. The
subjective factor of the well-founded fear is the applicant’s state of mind and his or her
personal experience of fear. It means that the judge or the RSD officer should examine
the previous experiences the applicant has gone through and how those experiences
have had an impact on him in a way that put him in a state of fear. The objective factor
is the availability of information in applicant country of origin that confirms the threats
the applicant has faced or may face in the future if he returns to his country. The
UNHCR follows the bipartite or combined approach which necessitates the satisfaction
of both conditions. This requires introducing the applicant, his family, and relatives’
previous experiences that led them to live in fear. Afterward, the available country of
origin information (COI) proving that the situation in the applicant’s country of origin
gives rise to a valid fear of staying or returning back to this country. 72
Beside the bipartite or combined approach many scholars posit that only the objective
element can sufficiently satisfy such an element, creating what is called “the objective
approach.” Hathaway and Foster for instance have affirmed that the state of mind of
the applicant should have nothing to do with the objectivity of fear, as “The concept of
well-founded fear is inherently objective. It denies protection to persons unable to
demonstrate a real chance of present or prospective persecution, but does not in any
sense condition refugee status on the ability to show subjective fear.”73 Zimmermann
agrees with the perspective of Hathaway and Foster, but he sees that the subjective
factor should be assessed also and should be seen only as an additional factor to the
objective. That if not satisfied it should not affect the determination of refugee status of
the applicant.74
It should be noted that, there is no connection between the well-founded fear of being
persecuted and the presence of the applicant in his country of origin, which means that
the fear of persecution may arise while the applicant was outside of his country of
origin, so there is no legal condition the applicant should have witnessed some events
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in his country to have a fear of persecution, as Goodwin-Gill indicates in his writings.75
According to UNHCR, there are several cases in which the applicant legally and
smoothly leaves his country, afterward, the situations and circumstances of his country
change in a way that may put his life in a threat if he returns, in this case, the applicant
will be considered as a “Refugee sur place.”76
c) Persecution
Persecution is the third element that must be fulfilled in the process of refugee status
determination. It is tricky as it has been used to widen or narrow the application of the
Refugee Convention. There is no universal definition for the term “persecution,” as
none of the international law instruments – including the 1951 Refugee Convention –
have explicitly defined it.77 The UNHCR, for instance, in its advisory opinion about
defining the term ‘refugee’ states that, “the concept of persecution was intentionally not
defined by the drafters of the 1951 Convention and the drafter’s original intention was
to allow for a sufficient degree of flexibility in order to encompass all future types of
persecution by the term.”78
The UNHCR and various scholars have most commonly used both articles 31 and 33
of the Refugee Convention to interpret the term, as it refers to persecution as it “is only
taking place where the applicant's ‘life or freedom’ is being threatened, on account of
race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social
group.”79 Furthermore, UNHCR extends this definition to also include any serious
human rights violation that is based on any of the five conventional grounds. 80
However, we differentiate between the terms ‘persecution’ and ‘discrimination,’ as the
latter does not always put the person’s life and freedom into a threat, but UNHCR has
determined that “a persistent pattern of consistent discrimination will amount to
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persecution on cumulative grounds.”81 It also set a distinguishes between ‘persecution’
and ‘prosecution’ as the latter is considered in the application of the penal code in the
case of committing crimes, however, the prosecution may turn into persecution if laws
are being applied in a discriminatory manner by the state.82
Leading scholars and practitioners in the field of International Refugee Law have not
yet reached a uniform interpretation of the element of persecution. However, most of
them mainly agree that persecution consists of two major elements; the first element is
the severe harm or threat, while the second element is the lack of state protection
regarding this harm. The differences between scholars arise rests on how to identify
and weigh the harm that may amount to persecution. Zimmermann, for instance,
suggests that “the notion of ‘persecution’ is interwoven with the protection of human
rights […] persecution often been referred to as the severe violation of human rights
accompanied by a failure of the State to protect the individual.”83 Hathaway and Foster
agree with Zimmermann that persecution requires both serious harm and lack of state
protection, but Hathaway indicates that the test of “serious harm” requires a violation
of one or more human rights. 84 They both posit in their writing that the ‘human rights
based approach’ is the only valid approach for interpreting the term “persecution” as
serious harm generates from human rights violations, so “reliance on international
human rights law to identify serious harm relevant to finding an individual to be at risk
of “being persecuted” is both principled and practical.”85 On the other hand we can see
leading writers such as Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam who see relying on
International Human Rights Law as invalid, as rapid developments in IHRL “take[s]
the concept of persecution far beyond the grounds spelled out in the Refugee
Convention.”86
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d) The Five Conventional Grounds
The fourth element of the inclusion criteria for refugee status determination is the
connection between the applicant’s well-founded fear of being persecuted and the five
conventional grounds stated in Article 1A (2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention. This
Convention has made this causal link compulsory in order to render a claim of refugee
status recognizable. It is an important element because most applicants can prove the
elements of fear and persecution but cannot connect them to the conventional grounds.
The grounds stated in the Convention are race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion. Thus, the applicant’s fear of the state of
persecution must happen “for the reason of” one or more of these grounds. As with the
previous elements the interpretation of this causal link has not been settled by legal
scholars and practitioners though, there have been several theories presented to interpret
the term “for reason of.” The UNHCR has adopted an approach called ‘contributing
clause’ and Michelle Foster follows it as well. This approach means that it is not a must
that one of the grounds is directly leading the applicant to be persecuted, rather it is
enough to establish that this ground has contributed to the applicant’s fear of
persecution.
Unlike the expansive approach the UNHCR has adopted, some domestic courts and
writers have followed the “but for test” which is an extremely narrowly structured
approach. It means that the applicants would not have faced persecution or the threat of
it “but for” the existence of the conventional ground. In other words, if the applicant is
from a certain clan and is persecuted and he has a well-founded fear, we can determine
that “but for” his membership in such a clan, he would not have faced such
persecution. 87 Other writers have adopted the “motivation approach” which means “to
determine the ‘real motivation for the actions of the persecutor” because the ‘potential
persecutor intends to harm the applicant on the basis of the applicant’s (real or
perceived) relationship to one of the 1951 Convention's grounds’.”88 Finally, some
writers such as Hathaway have adopted the “bifurcated approach” that persecution has
two elements which are serious harm and failure of state protection, a connection is
established if at least one of those elements is fulfilled based on the conventional
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grounds. In other words, if it can be established that the applicant has faced harm
because of one of the grounds, or even if he has not but the state refuses to protect him
for a reason based on conventional grounds, the nexus is established.
As we have seen in this chapter, how complex the process of identifying the person to
be a refugee or a migrant can be. To do so, I have presented different legal definition
for both terms which explained the blurred relation between them. In addition, the
Refugee Status Determination (RSD) which is conducted by refugee courts and
UNHCR to determine whether the person is considered to be a refugee or not is
explained. These process to be completed, the applicant must fulfill the four elements
of the refugee definition, those elements are: alienage, a well-founded fear, persecution
and the connection of them all to one or more of the five conventional ground which
are race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion. In the next chapter, the violations of socio-economic rights will be discussed
and whether they can fall under the context of the International Refugee Convention or
not.
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IV - Understanding International Refugee Law under the Framework of
International Human Rights Law
In the last decade, international refugee law jurisprudence has evolved to bringing new
interpretations of the 1951 Refugee Convention. As I mentioned earlier, the Convention
is silent when it comes to defining some legal terms such as well-founded fear,
persecution and the five conventional grounds which constitute the main elements of
the refugee definition. Satisfying these elements set by Art. 1A (2) of the Refugee
Convention are crucial for determining whether a person should be considered a refugee
or not. International Refugee Law academics and practitioners have reached different
interpretations of those terms. Every interpretation relies on a different context. In this
chapter, my main focus is on the International Human Rights Law approach as it has
long been debated and contested by different legal scholars. Additionally, it is the most
appropriate approach for arguing about economic and social rights violations
amounting to persecution in respect to the Refugee Convention.
The human rights approach in interpreting the Refugee Convention was first advocated
by Vernant in 1953. He suggested that the term “persecution” should be interpreted as
“severe sanctions and measures of an arbitrary nature, incompatible with the principles
set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”89 At the time, Vernant’s
methodology in interpreting refugee law terms was revolutionary, as he shed the light
on one of the most important human rights instruments in history – the UDHR– which
had not yet been recognized as obligatory under customary international law. 90 This
analysis was not widely accepted by the community of international law until 1991,
when Hathaway presented his analysis which proposed that the term ‘persecution’ is
best understood as “sustained or systemic violation of basic human rights demonstrative
of a failure of state protection.”91 He established that in order to understand the
graveness and seriousness of any harm by amounting to persecution, one should assess
the harm under the framework of human rights, specifically, under the International Bill
of Rights consisting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic,
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Social and Cultural Rights. 92 Hathaway’s interpretation has been deemed very
progressive by many writers, as it made it easier for the Convention to encompass more
claims than had ever been recognized by domestic courts. For instance, gender-based
violence is now recognized by courts and scholars to be considered a form of
persecution because of the human rights approach which has revealed how much
women around the world suffer as a result of it.93 Many other commentators and writers
have joined Hathaway in his interpretation such as Goodwin-Gill, 94 Helene Lambert95
and Jacqueline Bhabha.96
The human rights standard has not been only used to analyze the term “persecution,”
but legal scholars and domestic courts have consistently used it to interpret the
conventional grounds, specially, the “membership of a particular social group” ground.
For instance, the Federal Court of Australia has considered using Article 16 (3) of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights to define the “family” as a particular social
group under the Refugee Convention. 97 In addition, those standards have been used to
establish whether the applicant’s voluntary acts could give rise to a well-founded fear.98
Furthermore, they were also used to assess the availability of state protection and the
availability of an internal flight alternative (IFA) for the applicant whereby he/she can
be safe from persecution.99
The UNHCR reflects on the human rights approach in many of its publications and
guidelines. In its Handbook the connection between human rights violations and
persecution is established. For instance, in distinguishing between persecution and
punishment, it stipulates that “recourse may usefully be had to the principles set out in
the International Covenants on Human Rights, which contain binding commitments for
the States parties and are instruments to which many States parties to the 1951
Convention have acceded.”100 The connection was further mentioned in UNHCR
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Executive Committee Conclusions (ExCom), Guidelines in International Protection
and many interventions in domestic courts proceedings. 101 We can also see The
Conference of International Refugee Law Judges, in which the Director of International
Protection has pressed the importance of human rights, stating that “human rights law
should and must provide the broad and objective indicators against which the term
“persecution” can be interpreted.”102 It is clear that the UNHCR has decided to take the
progressive approach held by many scholars and commentators in order to employ a
more persuasive and clear interpretation of the Refugee Convention.
A. International Human Rights Law Instruments and Their Connection to
Refugees
Over the past two decades, legal scholars have introduced new developments in
international human rights law, recognizing its efficiency in interpreting the elements
of the “refugee” definition under the 1951 Refugee Convention. They have tried to
adopt the human rights-based approach to ensure a more universal and objective
application of the Convention, which should lead to more uniformity and consistency
in decision making regarding who qualifies for international protection under refugee
law. 103 Deborah E. Anker for instance is one of the first writers to recognize the
evolution of international refugee law under the human rights law framework. She
explains the steps by which international human rights law started to recognize and
understand “gender-based” persecution, and adopt this analysis in cases of female
genital mutilation and sexual violence.
These significant developments that have occurred in the last three decades have
affected the application of international refugee law. 104 For instance, the UNHCR in
2002 published guidelines regarding gender-based persecution and other refugee claims
related to this issue.105 It also has published many guidelines relating to female genital
101

Supra note 90 at 32.
Erika Feller, Address to the Conference of the International Association of Refugee Law Judges,
(2000-2001) 15 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 381 at 383.
103
Marouf, F., & Anker, D. (2009). Socioeconomic Rights and Refugee Status: Deepening the
Dialogue Between Human Rights and Refugee Law. American Journal of International Law, 103(4),
784-796.
104
Deborah E. Anker, Refugee Law, Gender and the Human Rights Paradigm, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS.
J. 133,136 (2002).
105
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Guidelines on International Protection No. 1:
Gender-Related Persecution Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 7 May 2002, HCR/GIP/02/01, available at:
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3d36f1c64.html .
102

33

mutilation and sexual violence recognizing for the first time those women who are
subject to such violations to fall under the conventional ground of “particular social
group.”106 These guidelines are a starting point for many other domestic guidelines
published by refugee courts and tribunals which recognize such claims as “genderbased” to fall under the Refugee Convention. This was not the case before the
developments that took place in the international human rights law field.
Many scholars have tried to use the same approach to prove that international refugee
law recognize asylum seekers with claims based on socio-economic persecution. They
believe that it has become obvious that IHRL now recognizes many violations of social
and economic rights to be considered as being persecution. Therefore, adopting the
human rights framework can lead to the recognition of refugees who have been
subjected to a severe violation of their rights to food, health, housing, education and
employment.107
B. Reasonableness of using the Human Rights Framework to Interpret the
Refugee Convention
As we see many legal scholars and commentators have agreed to rely on the human
rights approach in order to have a better understanding and solid interpretation of the
legal key terms set by the Refugee Convention. The important question to ask what the
justification behind choosing an external standard for interpreting the Refugee
Convention actually is? Jurisprudence including court decisions have indicated that
although the international treaty is applied domestically, but it must be interpreted as
“consistently and uniformly as possible.” 108 In the case of R v. Secretary of State for
the Home Department, Lord Steyn explained how courts could have an interpretation
for the terms of the Refugee Convention, he indicated that, “In practice it is left to
national courts, faced with material disagreement on an issue of interpretation, to
resolve it. But in so doing it must search, untrammeled by notion of its national legal
culture, for the true autonomous and international meaning of the treaty. And there can
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only be one true meaning.” 109 The court also has stated that “the 1951 Refugee
Convention, like other multilateral treaties, had one true autonomous interpretation
which must be decided upon as a question of law. In the absence of a ruling from the
International Court of Justice under Art 38 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, national
courts had to identify the one true interpretation.”110 In this way, the court has indicated
that it and other courts should identify the true interpretation for the provisions of the
Refugee Convention.
1. To a More Objective and Universal Standard
Judges have continuously tried to find a more objective standard to interpret the
Refugee Convention by; many of them have indicated the dangers that can emanate
from leaving judges to decide whether what the applicant is facing amounts to
persecution or not based on subjective parameters and based on their own discretionary
power.111 This objective standard has been explicitly identified by the English Court of
Appeal in Sepet v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, in which one of the
judges posited that, “however wide the canvas facing the judge’s brush, the image he
makes has to be firmly based on some conception of objective principle which is
recognized as a legitimate source of law.” 112 Courts have also emphasized the idea of
“universal standards,” in other words, looking for the “international meaning” of the
Refugee Convention. 113 The UNHCR has also followed the same path of seeking
universal rules and norms governing the interpretation of the Refugee Convention and
governing the process of Refugee Status Determination. As the High Commissioner for
Refugees has emphasized that “the UNHCR has constantly sought to bring about a
certain measure of uniformity in the elaboration of eligibility criteria with a view to
ensuring that all applicants are treated according to the same standards.”114
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Besides the UNHCR stating an objective standard and universal interpretation would
serve justice among applicants, courts have given another reason which depends on the
expected the outcome of the case. In Australia, the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT)
has indicated that applicants have the right to foresee the result of their applications.
This would only happen if judges’ application of law and the interpretation of its
provisions were consistent and unified. It states that: it is “important that so far as
possible decision-makers adhere to objective concepts capable of universal application
and susceptible to the jurisprudence of international bodies, so that uniformity can be
applied and applicants are able to have a better idea of whether their claims are likely
to succeed.”115 The use of the objective standard would be more consistent with the
nature of the principle of refugee as the claims of the asylum-seekers may hugely vary
from one to another; the kinds of threats they are facing are different; the nature of the
agents of persecution whether they are states or individuals are not the same, and the
fear they have to stay or to return to their countries is based on their background and
the cultures they come from.
Unlike most domestic courts and dominant jurisprudence adopting the objective view,
the US jurisprudence eschews it and instead uses a more subjective perspective. It is
clear from its decisions that it depends more on vague and flexible terms to interpret
the term “persecution.” For instance, the Ninth Circuit in 1998 defined persecution to
be “the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ (in race, religion or
political opinion) in a way regarded as offensive,”116 On the other hand, the Seventh
Circuit later in 2000 established that persecution is understood as any harm or
punishment for religious, political or other illegitimate reasons that “rises above the
level of mere harassment,”117 In 2002 in changed its perspective adding that the
illegitimacy of the reasons leading to the harm should be seen from the perspective of
the US legal system. 118 It is clear from reading such cases that courts have depended on
the subjective notion of “offensiveness.” Such notion depends on the subjective
assessment of every judge which is far away from the adoption of any objective model.
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Many legal scholars have indicated the dangers behind adopting the subjective
approach. For instance, Hathaway and Foster stipulate that following such an approach
leads to devastating outcomes when it comes to gender-related persecution, as judges
would depend on their cultural backgrounds in determining refugee status.119 They
indicate many cases in which courts have rejected granting refugee status to
homosexuals as they could have easily avoided persecution if they had managed to hide
their sexuality or limit their sexual practices. 120 In one of those cases decided by the
Federal Court of Australia, a homosexual applicant was denied protection based on the
same argument. The court state: “The evidence is that [the applicant] can avoid a real
chance of serious harm simply by refraining from making his sexuality widely known
- by not saying that he is homosexual and not engaging in public displays of affection
towards other men. He will be able to function as a normal member of society if he does
this.”121 Judges also have used the subjective approach to reject many women applicants
claiming refugee status who based their applications on gender-based discrimination by
justifying it according to the applicant’s culture or religion. For instance, in the Matter
of Johnson, the immigration court denied the claim of a woman from Sierra Leone who
left her country because she feared that her relatives would practice female genital
mutilation (FGM) on her young daughters. The reasoning was shocking as the
immigration judge stated that ‘while some cultures view female genital mutilation
(FGM) as abhorrent and/or even barbaric, others do not.’122 Thus, in doing so the court
depended in a more subjective approach which is the cultural background of the
applicant, which –if widely used– would lead to devastating consequences.
2. Choosing Human Rights as an Objective Standard for Interpreting the Refugee
Convention
It is clear that the subjective approach is very risky when it comes to determining
refugee status. This is why many scholars and practitioners have asked for an objective
and uniform standard to depend on while interpreting the terms of the Refugee
Convention. The question pertaining here is whether international human rights law is
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the appropriate standard to follow when interpreting the Refugee Convention or not. To
answer this question going back to the general rules governing treaty interpretation set
by the public international law is necessary. One of the main treaties governing the
process of drafting, concluding and interpreting treaties is The Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties (VCLT).123 This convention provides a guide for interpreting the
1951 Refugee Convention. The main obstacle before this process is that, technically
speaking, the Vienna Convention should not be applied in interpreting the Refugee
Convention as the latter was drafted 18 years earlier, and Art. 4 of the Vienna
Convention states,
“Without prejudice to the application of any rules set forth in the present
Convention to which treaties would be subject under international law
independently of the Convention, the Convention applies only to treaties which
are concluded by States after the entry into force of the present Convention with
regard to such States.”124
It is agreed upon between legal scholars and practitioners that the VCLT is part of
customary international law, which means that it should be applied to all treaties and is
binding to all states. This view was supported by the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
in its decision in Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), in which the
court affirmed that in spite the treaty being concluded between the two countries in
1955, it should be interpreted according to the rules set by the VCLT, which is part of
customary international law. 125 This stance was reaffirmed in Maritime Delimitation
and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, in which the court also indicated
that the treaty between both countries should be interpreted according to the rules set
by the VCLT.126
The main article that governs the process of treaty interpretation is Art. 31 of the VCLT,
which is entitled “General Rule of Interpretation.” It states that ‘[a] treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.’127
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Determining the context of the Refugee Convention is not an easy task to do, especially
that we need to determine first the “object and purpose” of this convention. The
dominant perspective among scholars is that the determination of the object and the
purpose of any treaty can be done by referring to its preamble. This view has been
supported by many courts working in the human rights field, such as, the European
Court of Human Rights in Golder v. the United Kingdom, in which the court asserted
that, “[A]s stated in Article 31 para. 2 of the Vienna Convention, the preamble to a
treaty forms an integral part of the context. Furthermore, the preamble is generally
very useful for the determination of the "object" and "purpose" of the instrument to be
construed.”128 There have been many conflicting views regarding the object and
purpose of the Refugee Convention. One of them sees the Convention’s aims as
pursuing “a human rights inspired purpose.” The second perspective believes that the
convention aims to protect individuals and that is a humanitarian purpose. Finally, there
is a view that perceives the convention to resolve mutual problems between state
parties. 129 The most convincing approach for me is the one which perceives the
convention to be inspired by the purpose of human rights and that is for many reasons.
Taking the view of human rights, it is clear when we read the first two paragraphs of
the 1951 Refugee Convention preamble that the drafters of the Convention explicitly
expressed the importance of the protection of the rights and freedoms of all humans.
They also referred to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which allows us to
presume the importance of such legal instrument at this time, and how drafters were
influenced by it. The preamble of the Refugee Convention highlights that,
“CONSIDERING that the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights approved on 10 December 1948 by the General Assembly have
affirmed the principle that human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms
without discrimination,
CONSIDERING that the United Nations has, on various occasions, manifested its
profound concern for refugees and endeavored to assure refugees the widest possible
exercise of these fundamental rights and freedoms.”130
Many national jurisdictions have adopted the human rights approach while interpreting
the Refugee Convention. They depend on the same argument that the preamble provides
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explicitly the importance of human rights and the instruments relating to it. For
instance, the Refugee Review Tribunal in Australia in Applicant A and B v. Minister
for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs has affirmed such approach by stating,
“The appellants seek no more than the enforcement of Australia's domestic law. That
law affords them certain rights if they can establish that they are "refugees" within the
Convention definition. That definition is, in turn, to be understood as written against
the background of international human rights law, including as reflected or expressed
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights.”131
It is clear from the court decision that the judges have drawn on the ICCPR in reaching
a more consistent interpretation of the refugee definition. It is also clear that many
courts and tribunals have relied on the ICESCR as both covenants enjoy wide
membership by states. Many writers and commentators have also indicated the
progressive amount of cases in which domestic courts have relied on international
human rights instruments in interpreting the Refugee Convention. 132 The courts have
also explicitly highlighted in its guidelines many human rights conventions and
covenants relating to the case at hand, even if the country has not signed or ratified. 133
The United Kingdom in its Gender Guidelines refers to the Convention on the
Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of
Others. In spite of the UK not being a signatory state of it.134 Furthermore, the same
guidelines refer to the Convention on Consent to Marriage and Minimum Age for
Marriage and Registration of Marriages. Such a convention is only signed by 49
states.135 In addition, Hathaway has acknowledged the use of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (‘CEDAW’) by many
courts to establish to how extent the discrimination the applicant suffers amounts to
persecution. 136
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C. Economic and Social Rights vs. Civil and Political Rights
I have determined how the human rights approach is the best fit for serving the universal
and objective standard for interpreting the refugee convention, especially the term
‘persecution,’ by determining whether the violation of any right can amount to
persecution or not. It is also important to recognize socio-economic rights and their role
in the model of human rights and whether they fall at the same level in hierarchy as
civil and political rights or are inferior to it. To do so, it is important to discuss two
dominant models that determine how socio-economic rights violations can amount to
persecution. The first approach was developed by Jean-Yves Carlier which is called
“the three scales” or the “normative hierarchical approach” as Michelle Foster used to
refer to it.137 The second approach is the “hierarchy of obligation” theory developed by
James C. Hathaway. Both theories carry their own weight among legal scholars and
practitioners but in my view the application of both of them is problematic.
1. Jean-Yves Carlier’s Hierarchical Approach
In the hierarchical approach, Carlier proposes that for decision makers to determine
whether a person should be granted refugee status or not, they should answer one main
question which is: whether there is a risk of persecution if the applicant returns to his
or her country. To answer this question the decision maker which is the court or the
UNHCR staff should break it into three sub-questions or “three scales”. Those questions
are, at what point does the risk exists, at what point does persecution exist? “[And] at
what point is the risk of persecution sufficiently established.”138 Those questions must
be addressed in order to assess the refugee’s claim. The most important question for us
here to answer is the second question pertaining the existence of persecution, as we
need to know how Carlier can determine the level of violation that amounts to
persecution. Carlier sees persecution as “the degree of breach of basic human rights
amounting to persecution.”139 He distinguishes between civil and political rights and
considers it in a higher position than the “quantitative and qualitative” severity of the
violation does not matter. On the other hand, the economic, social and cultural rights
violations should be very severe in order to consider them as a persecution, he states,
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“The more fundamental the right in question is (right to life, physical integrity, freedom
. . .), the less quantitatively and qualitatively severe the treatment need be. The lower
the priority attributed to the violated freedom (economic, social or cultural rights), the
more quantitatively and qualitatively severe the treatment must be.”140
It is clear from the theory that Carlier puts civil and political rights in higher a position
than economic, social and cultural rights. This approach has been rarely used by refugee
courts and tribunals in an explicit way, however, it has been used more implicitly when
they used to reject claims of an economic or social nature on the grounds that it the
violation is not enough to amount to persecution. 141
2. Hathaway’s Core Obligation Approach
Unlike Carlier, James Hathaway refuses to use the three scale normative approach, he
invented a new model of hierarchy depends on states’ obligations in relation to different
human rights instruments. He adopts another conceptual approach. As Foster call it
“hierarchy of obligations.” This approach is complicated to a certain extent as it
establishes a four-tier structure that when followed we can determine if the violation
amounts to persecution or not, regardless of the type of right that has been violated.142
Marouf and Anker give a simplified interpretation of the “hierarchy of obligations”
theory and its four tiers. The first tier is the rights stated in the UDHR and explicitly
mentioned in the ICCPR as binding with no derogation permitted; the violations to any
of those rights should automatically constitute persecution. The second tier includes the
same rights as those in the first tier but with derogation permitted in the case of public
emergency. In this case, if it is proven that there was no actual connection to an
emergency or the state was abusing its powers, then those violations amount to
persecution. The third tier comprises those rights in the UDHR and codified in the
ICESCR. The violation of those rights amount to persecution if “the state ignores these
interests despite the fiscal ability to respond,” or if the violations are grave and extreme
enough that they results in the deprivation of life or cruel, inhumane and degrading
treatment. The fourth tier includes those rights in the UDHR that are not codified in the
ICCPR or ICESCR. The violation of those rights cannot be considered as
persecution. 143
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In Hathaway’s approach it is clear that he puts the economic and social rights in the
third category inferior to civil and political rights. This approach has been prominently
accepted by most of the courts in the United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand, as
judges have repeatedly and explicitly manifested this theory in their judgments of
various cases while determining whether any violation to a human right amounts to
persecution. There is a clear difference between this model and the theory of Carlier
explained above. The first deals with the violation of rights from the perspective of the
‘nature of state obligation’ towards those rights, while the second, deals with the
hierarchy of rights as if there is a “normative priority” to some of them over the
other.144
It is clear that both Carlier and Hathaway’s approaches categorize economic and social
rights as inferior to civil and political rights. This is the same approach that most
common law courts have adopted in the determination of refugee status. I reject both
approaches as I believe that economic and social rights should be at the same level as
civil and political rights when it comes to refugee status determination. I do also believe
that claims of refugee status are more complex than determining it according to a fixed
model of hierarchies. As the applicant is likely to have mixed fears of persecution that
can be connected to different conventional grounds. Those fears can reflict some
political rights violations that automatically affect him financially. For instance, the
applicant may have his properties confiscated by the government for expressing his
political opinion, so his right to free speech is violated as well as his right to property
and shelter. In the next chapter, I will speak more about economic and social rights
violations and to what extent they can be considered persecution under the Refugee
Convention with examples from the precedents of some refugee courts and tribunals.
Moreover, I would establish a connection between economic deprivation and the
Refugee Conventional Grounds according to recent development in both literature and
judicial practices in order to close the chain of refugee status determination.
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V- Socio-Economic Claims under International Refugee Law
This chapter, challenges both Carlier’s and Hathaway’s hierarchal approaches with new
developments in the field of international human rights law and state practices. I
elaborate on some economic and social rights and to see to what extent their violations
can amount to persecution. Finally, I establish a connection between economic
deprivation and the different refugee conventional grounds under a more developed
understanding of refugee law with a focus on the fifth ground the applicant’s
membership to a particular social group.
A. The History of the adoption of the Hierarchal Approach
The adoption of a hierarchal approach has been very popular among scholars and legal
practitioners since the implementation of both the ICCPR and the ICESCR by most of
the states around the world. There is a historic distinction between both categories of
rights which was started during the Cold War and after the rights articulated by the
UDHR were divided into two categories of rights. The first group related to the ICCPR
which was supported by the North and the West and the ICESCR which was supported
by the East and the South. Afterwards, many writers from the states supporting the first
category have been discussing which category of rights should prevail over the other,
and whether there is a hierarchy between both categories. They also have discussed
whether certain rights should be given more attention and importance over the others.
Those writers argue that civil and political rights should be on a higher level. They refer
to civil and political rights as the “first generation of rights,” while socio-economic
rights are inferior to them and referred to as the “second generation rights.”
Arguments have been raised to justify this categorization of rights and their hierarchies.
One contends that civil and political rights are liberal by nature as they only impose
negative obligations on the state. Furthermore, states should refrain from any actions
that violate these rights or reduce their benefit to the people. On the other hand,
economic and social rights are by nature positive rights, which require states to take
positive actions to assure their implementation. For some, civil and political rights do
not require state expenditures as they only require the state to refrain from violating
them. Unlike economic and social rights, they demand enormous expenditure as they
are positive rights that require positive actions by the state to be implemented. Finally,
some writers argue that civil and political rights are justiciable, which means that any
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violations of them can be easily challenged in courts, while economic and social rights
are not justiciable due to their complex nature requiring judges to do extensive
economic research to prove that states have not fulfilled their duties under international
human rights law. All of those arguments are in the process of being challenged in
modern literature. In the next section various perspectives of literature that tackle such
arguments will be presented.
B. Challenging the Legitimacy of Putting Rights into a Hierarchy
There are strong challenges to the arguments of categorizing rights into distinct levels
of hierarchy. Throughout the past few decades many scholars and treaty bodies’
practices and guidelines have challenged the dominant view that civil and political rights
are negative rights that only require state to refrain from taking actions that violates
them, while economic and social rights are naturally positive rights that require states to
carry out actions to implement them. Reading the preambles and the articles of both
covenants we can easily say that for a state to implement such provisions, there should
be both negative and positive actions taken from its side. This is also clear when we
examine the Human Rights Council’s General Comments regarding the implementation
of the ICCPR. In General Comment 31 regarding legal obligation under article 2, para.
1, the HRC stresses the point that

respecting all rights requires positive actions on

the state’s side to insure their implementation. It states that, “the legal obligation under
article 2, paragraph 1, is both negative and positive in nature.”145
Moreover, in General Comments regarding some civil rights such as the right to life,
the HRC has stressed that respecting such rights requires positive actions to be taken
by the state. It states that, “the Committee has noted that the right to life has been too
often narrowly interpreted. The expression (inherent right to life) cannot properly be
understood in a restrictive manner, and the protection of this right requires that States
adopt positive measures.”146 The same approach has been taken towards the prohibition
of torture and cruel treatment or punishment. General Comment 20 posits that, “It is the
duty of the State party to afford everyone protection through legislative and other
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measures as may be necessary against the acts prohibited by article 7.”147 We can see
also General Comments regarding the right to a fair trial and public hearing, 148 the right
to vote,149 right to equality between women and men;150 in all of the general comments
published by the HRC, we can find stress on the positive actions required by the state
to implement those rights.151 Finally, the HRC has articulated it explicitly concerning
the interpretation of art. 24 of the ICCPR regarding the rights of the child. It states,
[…] every possible economic and social measure should be taken to reduce
infant mortality and to eradicate malnutrition among children and to prevent
them from being subjected to acts of violence and cruel and inhuman treatment
or from being exploited by means of forced labor or prostitution, or by their use
in the illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs, or by any other means. 152
On the other hand, the economic and social rights stipulated by the ICESCR require
states to take some negative actions by refraining to intervene in the implementation of
some of those rights, such as the right to join trade unions and the prohibition of
discrimination in the application of all economic and social rights. The UN Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has stipulated in many of its general
comments on the rights adopted by the ICESCR that states should refrain from
interfering directly or indirectly in the enjoyment of such rights, such as the right to
water.153 That is also seen in other general comments regarding the rights to education,
housing, health and food.154
This leads us to the second argument which states that economic and social rights are
more aspirational than rights as they require gross government expenditure unlike the
civil and political rights which do not affect national income and expenditure. The first
response to such an argument is discussed in the last section categorizing rights into
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negative and positive rights, and how this should be regarded as a misconception.
Moreover, some writers have indicated that civil and political rights cost states
enormous levels of expenditure annually in order to be fulfilled. For instance the right
to a free trial requires the state to spend huge amounts of money to guarantee the
efficiency of its judicial bodies. Furthermore, the right to vote requires the state to spend
enormous amounts of money to guarantee free and transparent elections. Paul Hunt in
his book, Reclaiming Social Rights: International and Comparative Perspectives, takes
New Zealand as an example. He paints a vivid picture of the spending by the New
Zeeland government to maintain and protect civil and political rights. 155
Finally, there has been a strong argument among scholars that civil and political rights
are justiciable unlike socio-economic rights. The debate of “justiciability” has received
considerable attention from legal scholars and practitioners in the last few decades. 156
E.W.Vierdag for instance has argued that the implementation of economic and social
rights requires policy choices by the government; such choices and decisions are
beyond the jurisdiction of the judiciary as judges would be interfering in the work of
the executive authority if they are given the ability to decide on those matters.157
Furthermore, there have been many arguments that economic and social rights are
vague and their violation is difficult to identify, as judges are not be capable of
determining the state obligations regarding the implementation of the Covenant.158
These arguments have been made by many writers for the past few decades, and they
have become increasingly invalid according to recent developments in the field of
international human rights law. For instance, the UN Economic Committee has
identified in many of its general comments, “the minimum core obligation,” which
determines the minimum effort each state should exert in order to maintain economic
and social rights, otherwise, it is responsible for committing violations against its
people. Moreover, the UN General Assembly has recently adopted the Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (OPICESCR) which is similar to the optional protocol adopted for the ICCPR. It allows
victims of economic and social rights violations to present their claims on the
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international level if they are unable or unwilling to access their countries’ judicial
path.159
In response to this ongoing debate concerning which category of rights should prevail
over the other, I reject the concept of placing rights into hierarchies by putting economic
and social rights in a place that is inferior to civil and political rights. There have been
many arguments made which justify such an approach although they have been
challenged by many legal critics and reflected in judicial decisions which stipulate that
all rights should be on the same level of importance. The Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action, which was approved by more than 170 countries, states that:
All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated.
The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and
equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the
significance of national and regional particularities and various historical,
cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of
States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote
and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.160
All rights shall be on the same level of importance; there should not be any hierarchy
among rights. This point of view has been adopted by many scholars and legal
practitioners in the last few decades and has been supported by the general comments
of treaty bodies such as the Human Right Committee and the UN Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as I mentioned before.
C. Challenging the Applicability of Recognizing Socio-Economic Claims for
Refugee Status
As I have discussed in the last three chapters, there has been a huge debate between
legal scholars and courts around how to assess claims of an economic nature under the
Refugee Convention. Some of those scholars have tended to follow a more expansive
approach by adopting international human rights law as a framework for interpreting
the Refugee Convention and I stand with this argument. However, other scholars have
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preferred to adopt a more restrictive perspective and reject the recognition of economic
and social rights violation as claims for refugee status.
Those who argue for a more restrictive approach to economic claims have mainly
adopted three arguments. Those arguments have been advanced by and cogently
addressed by David Martin one of the leading refugee law scholars in the US, who has
also joined in drafting many laws related to immigration and refugee policy in the US.
Firstly, Martin argues that the main purpose of the Refugee Convention is ‘to assign a
scarce resource, namely, asylum.’ Asylum in itself should not respond to need in social
and economic rights perspective, because the applicant’s country is commonly
receiving relief and development aid, therefore, we should not ask countries which are
providing economic aid to other countries to also spend on their citizens seeking asylum
for economic purposes. However, if the country of origin refuses to receive aid from
other developed countries, in this case, we should consider that decision as a kind of
resistance and therefore in that instance this action is of a political nature. So the
applicant’s claim will be considered on political grounds and not on a social and
economic basis. 161 In contrast to this view, Goodwin-Gill and McAdam identify the
purpose of the Refugee Convention from the preamble of the Universal Declaration for
Human Rights in order to achieve the widest exercise of rights and freedoms, setting
aside Martin’s argument of economic relief and assistance. 162
Secondly, Martin contends that “the institution of asylum is not coterminous with
human rights policy.”163 He further argues that the refugee convention is not “to
express sympathy, to note human rights abuses whenever they appear, or to register
disapproval of a practice.” 164 He believes that IRL should not encourage individuals to
escape their countries; on the contrary, they should witness, share and join the
communal struggles of their home countries. 165 Kate Jastram seems to agree with
Martin in some points and disagree on others. Jastram argues that it is not realistic to
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believe that IRL should cover all human rights violations; it is not one of its core
essentials. However, she believes that adopting Martin’s concept would lead to
devastating consequences for refugees; as they will have an obligation not only to prove
that they are not abusing the asylum system, but also to play a ‘heroic’ role and prove
they are not putting their own interest above their countries’ interests selfishly.
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The third argument Martin raises is that asylum is a scarce political resource and that
expanding economic claims will negatively affect it. He argues that asylum is a political
tool, which has limits of protection; therefore lowering the threshold to include
economic claims would take many numbers at the expense of those who have real ‘civil
and political’ claims and in need of protection.167 McAdam on the other hand seems to
disagree; he sees those restrictive interpretations as Martins’ are invalid. He believes
that excluding some groups from protection will not eliminate those groups; otherwise,
it will simply create new categories of unprotected persons.168 Kate Jastram also agrees
with McAdam at this point.169 Thus we can clearly see that some commentators such
as Martin has been trying to provide various arguments to demolish the idea of
recognizing socio-economic claims as eligible for refugee status.
D. Economic and Social Rights Violations as Persecution
The important question that arises now after proving that all rights are equal is whether
violations to economic and social rights amount to persecution or not, and if yes,
whether there are any judicial practices regarding this implementation. After going
through the literature related to international refugee law and socio-economic rights,
and after examining various court decisions issued from many high courts around the
world, I confidently respond affirmatively to both questions. In the next part, I would
elaborate on socio-economic rights and their relation to persecution focusing on two
main rights which are: the right to education and the right to health. Both rights have
been extensively discussed by many national courts and by the UNHCR in its most
recent guidelines regarding refugee status determination.
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1. The Right to Education and Persecution
There are many provisions in international law instruments that recognize and
implement the right to education at different educational levels. The two main
provisions that broadly elaborate on this right is the ICESCR in Art. 13 and the CRC in
art. 28. Both provisions state using similar terms that the right of education should be
granted to all people at different stages of education without discrimination. They also
state that at the primary level of education, it shall be compulsory and available free to
all,”170 while for the secondary education it “shall be made generally available and
accessible to all by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive
introduction of free education.”171 Finally, at the higher education level it, “shall be
made accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by every appropriate means, and in
particular by the progressive introduction of free education.”172 The (CESCR)
committee has stressed in many of its general comments the vital importance of the
right to education and its relation to human dignity and the “development of human
personality.” It considers such a right as one of the “minimum core obligations” that
every state should abide by. 173 The committee in the very beginning of its general
comment no. 13 clearly states:
Education is both a human right in itself and an indispensable means of realizing
other human rights. As an empowerment right, education is the primary vehicle
by which economically and socially marginalized adults and children can lift
themselves out of poverty and obtain the means to participate fully in their
communities. Education has a vital role in empowering women, safeguarding
children from exploitative and hazardous labor and sexual exploitation,
promoting human rights and democracy, protecting the environment, and
controlling population growth. Increasingly, education is recognized as one of
the best financial investments States can make. But the importance of education
is not just practical: a well-educated, enlightened and active mind, able to
wander freely and widely, is one of the joys and rewards of human existence.174
After recent developments in the field of human rights law, the vital necessity of the
right to education has become obvious at all levels. That is due to the considerably
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amount of work carried out by human rights groups and activists around the world show
how children globally suffer from the violation of the right to education. Most children
are prohibited from going to school and in most cases there is a discriminatory factor
related to this prohibition. For instance, Human Rights Watch has indicated in its report,
Failing Our Children: Barriers to the Right to Education that “[All over the world] that
children suffer discrimination in gaining access to education, based on their race,
ethnicity, religion, or other status.”175 It also indicates in another report how girls are
more commonly excluded from the process of education than boys at early age,
especially if one of their family members is ill. For example, in case of Kenya where
AIDs is a widespread disease, only 6 percent of the girls reach grade five of primary
education. 176
Many court decisions also show that many children experience bullying at school at a
very early age for many reasons including their religion, ethnicity and color. For
instance, in one of the cases presented before the Refugee Review Tribunal of Australia
(RRT), a Sabean Mandaean child from Iran who belongs to a minority religious group,
testified being excessively bullied by his fellow Muslim colleagues and teachers at
school, who tried to convert him to Islam. He also testified that Muslim men and
children tried to avoid touching him or sharing food with him, as he is regarded to be
less clean than other children from other religious backgrounds. The Tribunal in this
case agreed that those acts of bullying based on grave discrimination against people
from the child’s religious group should be regarded as acts of persecution against him,
as it would hinder him from finishing primary school and would have a serious
psychological impact on him. 177 Another judgement from the same Tribunal argued that
the “[d]iscriminatory denial of access to primary education is such a denial of a
fundamental human right that it amounts to persecution.”178
There is another well-known example of a court decisions based on the asylum-seeker’s
membership of a particular social group. The Refugee Protection Division (RPD) of the
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Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB) ruled in one of its cases that a gypsy
girl from Hungary, who had been bullied at school by her colleagues and her teachers
recognized that her chances of finishing her primary school education were “greatly
diminished” because of the discriminatory practices she was subjected to. They
explained that in this case the prevention of education was based on discrimination
against her on the ground of her membership to “a particular social group” amounting
to persecution, so the girl was recognized to be a refugee. 179
There is no question that after the most recent developments in the field of economic
and social rights, the violation or denial of the right to education amounts to persecution
in the sense of international refugee law and the determination of refugee status. This
view was supported by UNHCR in its guidelines: “It is only in certain circumstances
that discrimination will amount to persecution. This would be so if measures of
discrimination lead to consequences of a substantially prejudicial nature for the person
concerned, e.g. serious restrictions on his right to earn his livelihood, his right to
practice his religion, or his access to normally available educational facilities.”180 It
also indicates in its guidelines regarding gender-based persecution the same:
discrimination against women when it reaches the level of their prevention from
education amount to persecution.181 The same approach has been followed by many
states and is reflected in those states’ guidelines regarding the refugee status
determination process (RSD). It established that the violation of the right to education
should be considered as an unbearable act of ill-treatment especially when it is
perpetrated in a discriminatory manner, thereby constituting persecution. 182
2. The Right to Health and Persecution
One of the most important economic and social rights is the right to health. It intersects
with many other rights like the right to education, the right to water and the right to
food. As indicated in chapters two and three the world has long witnessed high rates of
poverty, the declining status of health care seen in the increasing number of deaths
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resulting from serious and sometimes non-serious infection. Those deaths could have
been avoided if governments had provided better health care for its citizens. The right
to health was stated explicitly in Art. 12 of the ICESCR, Art. 25 of the UDHR, Art. 5
of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, art. 11 and 12 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women and art. 24 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
As the CESCR has established in General Comment no. 14 regarding the right to health:
“Health is a fundamental human right indispensable for the exercise of other human
rights. Every human being is entitled to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard
of health conducive to living a life in dignity.”183 Similar to the right to education, the
economic committee confirmed that with regard to the right to health, states have a
“core obligation” to enjoy the satisfaction of such right, by providing the minimum
essential levels of health care to its citizens. 184 It places core obligations on every state
including “ensur[ing] the right of access to health facilities, goods and services on a
non-discriminatory basis, especially for vulnerable or marginalized groups.”185
Many refugee courts and tribunals have relied on the “minimum core obligations” set
by the ICESCR to grant asylum-seekers refugee status based on the violation of their
right to health. For instance, in the previously mentioned court decision issued by the
Refugee Review Tribunal of Australia (RRT) concerning a Sabean Mandaean child
from Iran who belongs to a religious minority group. The court found that such a group
also faced persecution regarding lack of proper medical treatment, as doctors and nurses
abstained from helping them because of their “alleged uncleanliness.”186 This point was
also made by some US courts regarding people with disabilities from Burkina Faso.
Some courts have established that disabled persons are subject to a severe violation of
their right to health amounting to persecution. 187
After reviewing many courts decisions and scholarly writing, it is clear that the right to
health is gaining increasing attention from legal scholars and practitioners. As a result,
most courts have started to recognize the denial of medical treatment in most cases to
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be life-threatening, and in itself sufficient to amount to persecution rendering the victim
eligible for refugee status. As the RRT has proposed, “[d]enial of access to medical
facilities of itself is such a denial of fundamental human rights that it amounts to
persecution.”188 One of the most successful recent claims affirmed by courts in the US,
Canada and Australia, are those claims related to applicants with HIV disease from
Africa. They consider patients with such a disease in many African countries as being
subject to social stigma and ostracism, commonly practiced by family members and
friends. In the US, for instance, an immigration judge ruled that poor ill persons from
Mali are more exposed to persecution as they are not be able to spend money for
medical treatment. He stated that “country conditions indicated that only individuals
with wealth and large sums of money can access treatment and avoid stigmatization.”189
Adding to the right to education, is the right to food. Recent court and human rights
commissions’ decisions have been paying greater attention to the right to food and how
countries violating this right lead to devastating outcomes towards their people. In
SERAC and CESR Versus Nigeria the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights issued its well-known decision which condemned the actions of the Nigerian
state toward Ogoni communities, who were seen as political opponents to the
government. Those communities have been subjected to discrimination based on
imputed political opinion. As a result, the government confiscated their lands to exploit
for oil. The Commission found that the destruction of Ogoni farmlands, rivers, crops
and animals had created “malnutrition and starvation among certain Ogoni
communities,” which the Commission viewed as a massive violation of the rights of
health and food that amounted to persecution. 190
It is clear after examining recent case laws and scholarly writings that recent human
rights developments have directly impacted the field of international refugee law;
scholars have increasingly started to adopt international human rights law as the most
appropriate framework to work from when it comes to having a more objective and
universal application of the Refugee Convention and a more accurate interpretation of
its terms. As a result, economic and social rights have been recognized by legal
practitioners and scholars to be on the same level with civil and political rights. This is
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after the historical tradition adopting a hierarchal approach towards rights, which
recognize economic and social rights to be inferior to other rights. Furthermore, court
practices reflect an evolution in judges’ understanding of the severity of economic and
social rights violations and the impact of them on people’s lives which could be more
devastating than the violations of civil and political rights. This new understanding is
reflected in many of their most recent judgements regarding the violation of the right
to education, health, water and food amounting to persecution under the Refugee
Convection.
E. Connecting Economic Deprivation to the Refugee Conventional Grounds
As I have previously discussed in this chapter, recent developments in the field of
international refugee law are considered to a new understanding of the concept of
persecution depending on other developments in international human rights law.
Economic and social right violations have been considered by many refugee courts and
tribunals to amount to persecution under the Refugee Convention. It is now important
to close the chain and elaborate on the last element by establishing the connection “the
causal link” between the applicants’ fear of persecution and the five conventional
grounds mentioned in the Refugee Convention, which is essential for any applicant to
be recognized as a refugee.
The conventional grounds mentioned in the 1951 Refugee Convention is the last
element in determining refugee status. Applicants fear economic deprivation that
amounts to persecution must establish that this depravation was or will be imposed on
them because of their race, nationality, religion, political opinion or membership in a
particular social group. I previously elaborated on several court decisions that
established a clear connection between economic deprivation or social rights violations
and the race, religion and political opinion such as: the Sabean Mandaean in Iran who
were found eligible for refugee status as they are socially persecuted for their religion.
Furthermore, the Ogoni communities in Nigeria who are economically persecuted for
their race and political opinion for opposing their government. The ground of
nationality has been used rarely in refugee claims and this applies also to persecution
based on civil and political rights violations as well.
In this section, I focus on the fifth and last ground which is membership in a particular
social group (MPSG) because most recent developments in the field of international
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refugee law are based on this ground.191 The MPSG ground has proven to be very
successful in including new types of refugee claims in the last few decades. Unlike
other conventional grounds, this ground has effectively expanded the convention’s
interpretation to protect new groups of people who were not previously considered by
courts. It has also been previously used by many writers and courts to recognize genderbased persecution and consider different groups like women living in specific
patriarchal societies, and members of the LGBT communities persecuted for their
sexual orientation in different countries around the world. 192
Interpreting the MPSG ground has been one of the most controversial topics in the field
of international refugee law in the last two decades; many writers have excessively
discussed the proper interpretation of this ground. 193 This controversy even has
extended to reach the UNHCR and as noted in its recent guidelines, it has also raised a
debate between courts in different legal systems.194 In the last few years, there has been
one approach that has dominated, which is the protected characteristics approach
“ejusdem generis.” This approach was first articulated by the US Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) in the Matter of Acosta,195 and has also been adopted by many courts in
Canada, New Zealand and the UK.196 Applying this approach to the Refugee
Convection, the BIA has ruled that,
Persecution that is directed toward an individual who is a member of a group of persons
all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic. The shared characteristic might
be an innate one such as sex, color or kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be
a shared past experience such as former military leadership or land ownership . . .
Whatever the common characteristic that defines the group, it must be one that the
members of the group either cannot change, or should not be required to change
because it is fundamental to their individual identities or conscience. 197
The UNHCR has followed the same approach towards defining the MPSG ground It
states in the Summary Conclusions that: “A particular social group is a group of persons
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who share a common characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted, and which
sets them apart. The characteristic will ordinarily be one which is innate,
unchangeable, or which is otherwise fundamental to human dignity.”198 Accordingly,
many courts following such approach have been able to identify new social groups
based on their economic conditions or social background. In the next section, I will
elaborate more on recent developments in judicial practices by which courts have
identified new social groups with a more on economic class and occupation.
1. Economic Class as a Particular Social Group
In this part, I will discuss whether economic deprivation can generate new social groups
under the recent common interpretation of the MPSG ground under the Refugee
Convention. In the last two decades courts have had conflicting views regarding
whether to recognize economic class and poverty as a PSGs or not -in other wordswhether being part of a certain economic class or being poor and economically
impoverished are innate and immutable characteristics or not. On the one hand, we can
see many Canadian decisions including the Federal Court of Appeal (FCA), which has
held that “the poor” can be considered as a distinctive social group under the Refugee
Convention. In Sinora v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, the applicant
claimed refugee status based on his membership of a particular social group “the poor
in Haiti.”199 The court indicated that poor people in Haiti are indeed considered to be a
PSG and granted the applicant the refugee status under this ground.200 Moreover, many
decision-makers in many jurisdictions have considered applicants’ claims from the
Midgan caste in Somalia. For instance, in a recent decision, New Zealand RSAA has
recognized such claim and determined that applicants from such caste are always
economically impoverished compared to members of other clans as they are “often kept
as slaves by other clans.” 201
Furthermore, in UNN (RE), the RPD determined refugee status for a Colombian
applicant for being poor. The court indicated that the applicant was targeted and
discriminated against because of his race and his socio-economic status, which makes
people like him more subject to murder or torture by gangs. The court concluded in its
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decision that: “Street children, poor young black men, and other ‘undesirables’ are
common targets. […] I find that the claimant suffered from discrimination amounting
to persecution because of his race and socio-economic group.”202 Canadian courts have
also considered new groups to fall under the same ground. For instance, “poor
compesinos in El Salvador”203 and “impoverished young women from the former
Soviet Union recruited for exploitation in the international sex trade.”204
Moreover, in the UK the Immigration Appeal Tribunal (IAT) in Ogbeide v. Secretary
of State for the Home Department in which the applicant a Nigerian girl was subjected
to human trafficking, has indicated that “young girls from Nigeria whose economic
circumstances are poor” are considered a PSG.205 In the US also, the Newark Asylum
Office has indicated in many of its decisions that “low-income individuals with HIV”
are considered a PSG.206 It is clear from the previous decisions that many courts have
used the “protected characteristics” approach to extend the Refugee Convention’s scope
of protection by including new groups which were never considered or protected.
On the other hand, we can find many other decisions which reject claims for refugee
status based on economic deprivation. They indicate that poor economic class may not
be recognized as PSG. These decisions were mainly based on the lack of the
immutability condition under the protected characteristics test. In UKS (Re), the
Refugee Protection Division (RPD) of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada
(IRB) has rejected the application of a Salvadorian applicant who claimed that he was
persecuted in his country for being a young poor male returning from the US. The RPD
indicated that: “being a male is innate, and being young is not changeable other than by
the natural ageing process. Being poor, however, is neither innate nor
unchangeable.”207 The Board has also rejected another application of a Jamaican
woman who claimed that she was persecuted and targeted by criminals in her country
for being poor, and based its decision on the same argument that poverty is a changeable
characteristic. 208 Furthermore, the New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority
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(RSAA) asserted in one of its decisions that: “poverty per se is not immutable, nor is it
so fundamental to the identity of the members that they ought not to be required to
change it.”209
After reading those cases which dismiss “the poor” from being recognized as a PSG, it
is clear that these decisions were grounded in an unrealistic assessment of the reasons
behind poverty and economic disadvantage and that is for two main reasons: firstly, in
none of those cases did the court assess the situation of the poor applicant in his or her
country in order to reach the conclusion that his poverty was changeable and not
immutable. Secondly, judges in their decisions have had a wrong presumption that
poverty is a changeable characteristic, which is very unrealistic as according to the
world’s current situation of poverty, which I discussed in the second chapter, it is clear
that the poverty rate in most developing countries continues to rise and the economic
conditions of the people are getting worse not vice versa.
2. Occupation as a Particular Social Group
In this section, I discuss whether people who share a common occupation can qualify
to a PSG under the understanding of the Refugee Convention according to recent
developments in literature and case law. It is important to reflect on occupation namely
as practical experience in the field has proved that many oppressive regimes have been
targeting people with certain occupation for various reasons. For example, their
occupation can be seen against the dominant religion of the country such as people
working on women’s rights field. Other people can be persecuted as their occupation is
regarded as a political tool for opposing the ruling regime like people working in the
human rights field. Many writers have indicated the hardship of connecting occupation
to the ground of MPSG, as in many cases such claims have failed to pass the
“immutable characteristic” test and that was clear in many court decisions.210 However,
recent case law has proven the courts’ have become more willing to consider such group
as a PSG.
Many writers such as Hathaway, Foster, Daley and Kelley have indicated that one’s
fear of being persecuted for the reasons of his/her employment or occupation is
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protected under the Refugee Convention.211 By applying the “immutable characteristic”
approach, we can establish that since freedom of employment is a basic right according
to art. 6 of the ICESCR and art 23 of the UDHR, people who are persecuted for their
occupation or are forced to leave or change their occupation should be considered as a
PSG. Many courts have considered many claims which has depend on occupation as a
social group. For instance: in the case of R v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department, ex parte Ouanes, the applicant who is an Algerian woman working as a
midwife for the government claimed that she has a well-founded fear of being
persecuted by fundamentalists for providing advice to women regarding contraception.
She also claimed that the Algerian government was unable and unwilling to protect her
from these fundamentalists who impose threats to her life. 212 The UK Court of Appeal
ruled in favor of the applicant granting her asylum as it considered midwives working
in Algeria as a PSG and eligible for refugee status under the Refugee Convention. The
court stated in its judgement that: “[T]he characteristic that defines the social group
must, in situations such as the present, be one that the members should not be required
to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or conscience.”213
Furthermore, in Nouredine v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs the
applicant who was an Algerian woman working in beauty industry claimed that she has
been persecuted by Muslim extremists for her work, as they see it as an immoral
industry that should be eliminated which imposed threats on her life. 214 The Australian
Federal Court of Refugees (FCR) held that the applicant is eligible for refugee status
and considered beauty workers in Algeria as a PSG who deserve protection under the
Refugee Convention. 215
On the other hand, in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Zamora the
Australian Federal Court of Refugees (FCR), rejected the claim of an Ecuadorian man
who claimed that his occupation as a tour guide made him part of a PSG. The court
noted that: “Quite apart from the risk of using persecution or the fear of persecution as
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a defining feature, in many cases an occupational group will not satisfy the requirement
that it be recognized within the society as a group, even though it may fairly be said
that the members of an occupational group have common characteristics not shared by
their society.”216 Furthermore, in Matter of Acosta, the BIA held that a group of taxi
drivers did not qualify the ground of PSG as they did not meet the immutable and
protected characteristics. It states that: “the members of the group [the taxi cooperative]
could avoid the threats of the guerillas either by changing jobs or by cooperating in
work stoppages.”217
It is clear after reading previous cases that some courts have started to recognize
occupation as a PSG, however that is not the case with other courts which continuingly
rejected similar claims based on the argument that occupation is not immutable and that
the claimant could have easily relinquished his or her occupation in order to avoid
persecution. I disagree with the latter argument for two reasons: firstly, courts by
adopting such an approach strictly, dismiss the fact that changing occupation puts much
hardship on the applicant, as he/she may have lived his whole life doing that job; and
presuming that he can easily shift from one occupation to another is unreasonable and
would put the applicant on higher risk of economic deprivation. Secondly, requiring the
applicant to leave his or her occupation conflicts with his basic right to work and
freedom of employment which would amount to a violation of his social and economic
rights.
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VI – Conclusion
As many regional refugee courts have started to recognize many asylum claims based
on economic and social deprivation in the last two decades, there is still no consensus
between them regarding the validity of such claims under the interpretation of the
Refugee Convention. Some legal scholars and practitioners have realized how
international human rights law is the most suitable framework to provide a proper
interpretation for the Convention, as it contains the objective and universal principles
decision makers can use to determine refugee status for asylum-seekers. This approach
has produced many new developments in the field of international refugee law. Genderbased violence is now regarded as persecution by most regional courts and even noted
by the UNHCR in its guidelines.
Nevertheless, claims based on economic and social deprivation are more complex and
are harder to be recognized for many reasons. First, the recognition of these claims
challenges the traditional dichotomy set between economic migrants and genuine
political refugees. Such a dichotomy has always been used by academic writers and
courts since the drafting of the Refugee Convention in 1951. Second, the approach
raises many security and financial complications for states as most people now regarded
as “irregular migrants” would be recognized as refugees and this places a legal
obligation on these states to give them safe entry and protection. Third, economic and
social rights have always been categorized and seen as inferior to civil and political
rights for many reasons such as: the former being positive rights that require states to
allocate expenditures to protect them; however the latter are negative rights that only
require states to abstain from taking any action that might violate them. Moreover, civil
and political violations are justiciable as they can be easily contested before courts. This
is unlike economic and social rights violations that in order to be contested judges
requires to evaluate the performance of the executive authority to protect these rights,
which is not their duty to do so and goes against the principle of the separation between
authorities.
This paper contests the traditional perspective of categorizing rights which promote the
prevalence of some rights over others. It argues that recent developments in the
international human rights law field show the invalidity of this categorization as many
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states and human rights tribunals have started to realize that all rights are
interconnected; any violation of one right also results in the violation of other rights.
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